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INTRODUCTION
The pressing question of what to do about online mis/disinformation1 has led
to a variety of reform proposals, the most seemingly uncontroversial of which is the
push to “media literacy.”2 Recently, rhetoric supporting pending federal media
1

Because this Essay focuses on media literacy as a way of dealing with false
information online generally, and because the differences between disinformation
(intentional falsehood designed to achieve strategic ends) and misinformation (false
communication that is either mistakenly or inadvertently created or spread, or as to which
strategic intention is not established) are not critical to my principal argument, I refer to
online falsity with the portmanteau term “mis/disinformation.” For links to definitions and
examples of online falsity, see “Fake News,” Lies and Propaganda: How to Sort Fact from
Fiction, U. MICH. LIBR. (Jan. 24, 2020, 9:15 AM), https://guides.lib.umich.edu/fakenews
[https://perma.cc/4GH5-5ESH].
2
Google searches for ‘media literacy’ delivered almost 5,000,000 results (with over
100,000 citations in Google Scholar). See, e.g., GOOGLE SCHOLAR, https://scholar.google.
com/scholar?hl=en&as_sdt=0%2C10&q=%22media+literacy%22&btnG= [https://perma.
cc/GPZ4-XAXL] (last visited Mar. 23, 2020).
“Media literacy” is a notoriously protean term with no single definition, perhaps in part
because it has been addressed by various different social science disciplines since the 1970s.
See generally MONICA BULGER & PATRICK DAVISON, DATA & SOCIETY INST., THE
PROMISES, CHALLENGES, AND FEATURES OF MEDIA LITERACY 3 (Feb. 2018),
https://datasociety.net/pubs/oh/DataAndSociety_Media_Literacy_2018.pdf [https://perma.
cc/4H53-5DMZ]; Omwoyo Bosire Onyancha, Knowledge Visualization and Mapping of
Information Literacy, 1975–2018, IFLA J. (Apr. 3, 2020), https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/
abs/10.1177/0340035220906536?journalCode=iflb
[https://perma.cc/H2ZW-KDDH]
(examining the history and evolution of information literacy and its spread across twentyseven multi-disciplinary fields); W. James Potter, The State of Media Literacy, 54 J. BROAD.
& ELEC. MEDIA 675 (2010) (cataloging 23 definitions from different disciplines); see
generally also Renee Hobbs, The State of Media Literacy: A Response to Potter, 55 J.
BROAD. & ELEC. MEDIA 419 (2011); Caroline L. Osborne, Programming to Promote
Information Literacy in the Era of Fake News, 46 INT’L. J. LEGAL INFO. 101 (July 2018),
https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-journal-of-legal-information/article
/programming-to-promote-information-literacy-in-the-era-of-fake-news/F8061544738F4C
6A3CFF3EAE34EDA42E [https://perma.cc/82NU-W89L]. Media literacy has an older
pedigree, however, dating back to the 1930s. See Anya Schiffrin, Fighting Disinformation
with Media Literacy—in 1939, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. (Oct. 10, 2018),
https://www.cjr.org/innovations/institute-propaganda-analysis.php [https://perma.cc/XJ42CNCZ] [hereinafter Schiffrin, 1939].
The most recent definition of media literacy from the National Association for Media
Literacy Education (NAMLE) is “the ability to access, analyze, evaluate, create, and act
using all forms of communication.” Media Literacy Defined, NAT’L ASSOC. FOR MEDIA
LITERACY EDUC., https://namle.net/publications/media-literacy-definitions/ [https://perma.
cc/53FW-36Q8] (last visited Feb. 21, 2020). Recently, various other adjacent terms—such
as information literacy and news literacy—have been used when focusing on online
disinformation, apparently reflecting the disciplines in which the terms are deployed. One
useful library-based categorization effort describes a literacy pyramid with information
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literacy legislation has framed that push as a matter of national security—suggesting
that audience empowerment through the provision of critical reading tools could
inoculate citizens against governance-threatening disinformation from foreign
agents.3
In addition to its limited focus on disinformation by foreign actors, this national
security frame implies a narrow interpretation of media literacy—emphasizing
individual competency to read factual claims skeptically. But success at this limited
level cannot ensure the kind of literacy that would fully promote the democratic
design. An additional frame beyond national security is necessary—one that seeks
to expand awareness of the role of the press in democracy and how domestic
delegitimation of the press by the Executive undermines our constitutional structure
and poses a fundamental threat to the republic. Accordingly, this Essay calls for a
two-pronged approach—one that seeks both: 1) to increase the effectiveness of
current disinformation-debunking models by adopting inter-disciplinary methods
and relying more explicitly on the lessons of social science research; and 2) to
broaden the focus and expand the targets of media literacy efforts aimed at
addressing the potential anti-democratic effects of strategic disinformation
campaigns aimed at the press itself.
The Trump administration’s delegitimizing refrain characterizing legacy media
as “fake news” institutions has doubtless exacerbated growing public distrust in
government and accountability institutions.4 It has also promoted arrogation of
power by the Executive. Media literacy must be broadened to encompass the more
capacious goal of helping citizens understand the structure, operations, and
literacy (defined as “the ability to locate, access, select, evaluate, manage, use, create and
communicate information effectively and responsibly”) subsuming media literacy, which in
turn subsumes news literacy and requires digital literacy, visual literacy, and numeracy/data
literacy. See Fake News: Literacies, CAL. ST. U. LONG BEACH, https://csulblis.libguides.com
/c.php?g=756956&p=5426991 [https://perma.cc/G78Y-LBRR] (last visited Feb. 21, 2020)
(describing the various literacies and compiling links to electronic resources for each).
Apparently, there is debate within the social science community as to the parameters of these
different literacy constructs (not to mention debate as to the character and scope of media
literacy itself). See, e.g., Jihii Jolly, News Literacy vs. Media Literacy, COLUM. JOURNALISM
REV. (Sept. 4, 2014), https://archives.cjr.org/news_literacy/news_literacy_vs_media_literac
.php [https://perma.cc/58RJ-SDC4]; Anya Schiffrin, Demand Side Solution: Teaching
Media Literacy in Order to Fight Disinformation—in 1939, in Mis and Disinformation
Online: A Taxonomy of Solutions (forthcoming 2020) (Ph.D. dissertation, University of
Navarra) (on file with author) [hereinafter Schiffrin, Demand Side]; see also Sonia
Livingstone, Media Literacy and the Challenge of New Information and Communication
Technologies, 7 THE COMM. REV. 1, 3–14 (2004). This Essay follows the convention in the
legal literature and legislation in this area by referring to “media literacy” as an umbrella
term, seeking to capture both accuracy-enhancement and deeper social and democratic needs.
3
See infra notes 23–27 and accompanying text. See generally also Osborne, supra note
2.
4
See, e.g., Lili Levi, Real Fake News and Fake Fake News, 16 FIRST AMEND. L. REV.
232, 257–62 (2018) and sources cited therein.
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constitutional role of the press through increased transparency about journalism, its
structural role in democracy, and the interconnected ways in which it is threatened.5
Expanding the public’s understanding of the proper role of the press and the ways
in which modern information industries operate attention markets, promoting the
audience’s awareness of its own cognitive blind spots, increasing reporters’ critical
acumen when dealing with information, and reframing newsworthiness norms and
awareness of disinformation techniques in order to lessen the mainstream press’s
vulnerability to informational manipulation can all be positive expansions of the
notion of media literacy beyond the ability to spot factual errors in particular articles.
The point of this shifted and expanded approach to media literacy is to address
our new informational and institutional realities, rather than to fight old wars with
old techniques. It should be designed to evolve and attuned to robust results of
empirical study. Admittedly, media literacy does have its skeptics—those who claim
that it has not succeeded so far, and who argue that disinformation is less a problem
of information than of cognitive bias, rendering information-forcing solutions
irrelevant (or even counterproductive).6 But the social science evidence so far does
not clearly portend the failure of well-designed media literacy.7 And an expanded
interpretation of media literacy diminishes the power of current critiques of today’s
efforts in any event.
Ultimately, however, even effective media literacy can and should be but one
piece of a broader media strategy—one that includes an economically reinvigorated
press, enhanced legal protections for press operations, increased consciousness of
the multiple ways in which journalistic norms can be manipulated, a healthier
technological environment for the dissemination of information to the public, and
critical attention to how the institutions of the press operate. Individual, audiencefocused approaches alone are not enough. Calls for media literacy in its multiple
forms should be broadly welcomed but should not distract from the need for such a
multi-faceted approach to addressing the social harms of disinformation, including
its systemic and structural aspects.8
The Essay proceeds as follows. Part I describes current and proposed legislation
designed to promote media literacy and maps the existing legislative agendas. Part
II examines the narrow sense of media literacy, which focuses on helping audiences
(and principally school-age audiences) identify false statements. The Part explores
how to increase the effectiveness of today’s media literacy interventions, focusing
on the shortcomings of current approaches, the need for an interdisciplinary and
empirically-grounded methodology, and new tech-based dangers. Part II argues that
5

See discussion infra Part III.
See discussion infra Sections II.A, II.B.2–3.
7
See discussion infra Sections II.A, II.B.
8
See, e.g., Whitney Phillips, The Toxins We Carry, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. (2019),
https://www.cjr.org/special_report/truth-pollution-disinformation.php [https://perma.cc/TX
8L-DRRH] (discussing the insufficiency of fact-checking as a response to “information
pollution” and calling for an “ecological” response focusing on “how our systems, our
actions, and our institutions intertwine in ways that create perfect conduits for pollution to
flow unchecked”).
6
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current approaches miss those unserved by school-based media literacy
requirements; that social science findings—rather than intuition—should be taken
into account in media literacy design; and that the fact-check-based model of media
literacy is problematic and insufficient as currently envisioned. Part III turns to a
broader view of media literacy, expanding both its goals and targets. This Part
focuses both on audiences and the press itself—calling for expanded audience
literacy and media self-literacy. It argues for initiatives designed to increase public
trust in the press as a constitutionally recognized monitor of power. Specifically,
Sections III.A.1 and III.A.2 focus on an expanded sense of media literacy for
audiences and respectively call for (1) transparency about press processes; and (2)
enhanced public knowledge about the modern media ecosystem, disinformation
techniques, and the cognitive biases that enable audience manipulation. Sections
III.B.1 and III.B.2 respectively suggest (1) including journalists as proper targets of
literacy initiatives; and (2) promoting self-examination and improvement of
journalistic and editorial practices.
I. NATIONAL SECURITY RHETORIC AND THE TURN TO MEDIA LITERACY
IN PENDING FEDERAL LEGISLATION
By contrast to overarching reform proposals—such as platform break-ups
under anti-concentration laws9 or legislation designed to ferret out and quell false
speech10—media literacy seems to be an easy and uncontroversial goal as to which
many across the spectrum of American political discourse agree.11 Recent polls

9

Such reform proposals have moved from the academy to the platforms of presidential
candidates. See, e.g., Matt Stevens, Elizabeth Warren on Breaking Up Big Tech, N.Y. TIMES
(Jun. 26, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/26/us/politics/elizabeth-warren-breakup-amazon-facebook [https://perma.cc/9YVB-556M].
10
See, e.g., Daniel Funke & Daniela Flamini, A Guide to Anti-Misinformation Actions
Around the World, POYNTER, https://www.poynter.org/ifcn/anti-misinformation-actions/#us
[https://perma.cc/4UQS-ADKU] (last updated Aug. 13, 2019).
11
See, e.g., CLAIRE WARDLE & HOSSEIN DERAKHSHAN, COUNCIL OF EUR.,
INFORMATION DISORDER: TOWARD AN INTERDISCIPLINARY FRAMEWORK FOR RESEARCH
AND POLICY MAKING 68 (2017), https://rm.coe.int/information-disorder-toward-aninterdisciplinary-framework-for-researc/168076277c
[https://perma.cc/NSD3-GSWN];
Michael Rosenwald, Making Media Literacy Great Again, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV.
(2017),
https://www.cjr.org/special_report/media-literacy-trump-fake-news.php.
[https://perma.cc/X95S-R6YC]. While critical media literacy initiatives have in the past
reflected a leftward political valence, the current calls for audience empowerment through
use of media literacy techniques appear to have widespread support across the political
spectrum. See, e.g., DAVID LAZER ET AL., COMBATING FAKE NEWS: AN AGENDA FOR
RESEARCH AND ACTION 9 (2017), https://www.sipotra.it/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Com
bating-Fake-News.pdf [https://perma.cc/4S6J-C8SX]; Daniel D. Barnhizer & Adam
Candeub, Elite Theory, Media Regulation, and ‘Fake News’ (2019) (unpublished
manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3449503 [https://perma.
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show that the public distrusts the news accessed on social media12 and would have
an appetite for training on how to find online resources for trustworthy information.
Whether because the platforms, the media, advertisers and any other major
players perceive little threat if reform focuses on media literacy, or because it seems
not to require much from the media sector itself, or it is consistent with notions of
American individualism, or it is perceived as more desirable than censorious
regulatory interventions due to “third party perception,”13 or it is envisioned as a
bulwark against foreign influence in U.S. elections to enhance national security,14
media literacy seems to have become a natural response to the complex and
seemingly intractable problems posed by false speech.15 In a world in which many
worry simultaneously about the harmful effect of speech on democratic institutions,
about government control of speech, about our constitutional commitment to
freedom of speech false or true, about the decline of public trust in virtually all
accountability institutions—and in which many people believe that others are more
at risk of negative influence from fake news than they themselves are16—a reformist
tack that promises to seat powerful tools in the hands of the individual in politically
neutral ways (and without command-and-control regulation) might well be
perceived as a godsend.17
cc/53U3-73U2]. For recent reports recommending media literacy as part of an overall
response to disinformation, see, for example, Rasmus Kleis Nielsen et al., What Can Be
Done? Digital Media Policy Options for Strengthening European Democracy, REUTERS
INST. (Nov. 25, 2019), https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/risj-review/what-can-bedone-digital-media-policy-options-europe-and-beyond [https://perma.cc/MEJ9-LNDV].
12
See Elisa Shearer & Elizabeth Grieco, Americans Are Wary of the Role Social Media
Sites Play in Delivering the News, PEW RES. CTR. (Oct. 2, 2019),
https://www.journalism.org/2019/10/02/americans-are-wary-of-the-role-social-media-sitesplay-in-delivering-the-news [https://perma.cc/XMZ6-3ALY].
13
See, e.g., S. Mo Jang & Joon K. Kim, Third Person Effects of Fake News: Fake News
Regulation and Media Literacy Interventions, 80 COMPUTERS IN HUM. BEHAV. 295, 299
(2018) (confirming third party perception (TPP)—pursuant to which individuals believe that
others are more vulnerable to false information than they themselves are—and finding that
TPP is positively correlated, across political parties, with approval of media literacy
interventions).
14
See discussion infra notes 24–26.
15
These are simply speculations; perhaps the enthusiasm for media literacy is grounded
on the belief that it can be effective. See Rosenwald, supra note 11.
16
See, e.g., Jang & Kim, supra note 13, at 17.
17
See Sonia Livingstone, Media Literacy: What Are the Challenges and How Can We
Move Towards a Solution?, LSE (Mar. 13, 2019), https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/parenting4digital
future/2019/03/13/media-literacy-what-are-the-challenges/ [https://perma.cc/4ZHQ-B8WC]
(“In our ever-more complex media and information environment, media literacy is being
hailed as a silver bullet solution. . . . [I]n the face of clashes of positive and negative rights,
regulatory difficulties, powerful global companies and short-termist political expediency,
this call in turn quickly morphs into a call for the supposedly ‘softer’ solution of educating
the internet-using public.”).
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As a result, the heightened concern about electoral disruptions by
disinformation on social media has led to a cottage industry of studies and initiatives
to promote media literacy in both private and public contexts. While the specifics
are contemporary, today’s turn to media literacy has deep antecedents in the media
discourse of the 1930s.18 States have adopted media literacy requirements for their
K-12 curricula.19 Universities have started investing in media literacy courses.20 The
platforms, such as Google and Facebook, have been funding media literacy efforts.21
On the legislative front, in addition to the existing curricular media literacy
requirements in many states,22 proposed federal legislation—entitled the Digital
Citizenship and Media Literacy Act (“DCMLA”)—has been introduced with
18

See Shiffrin, 1939, supra note 2.
See, e.g., Legislative Activity Across the Country, MEDIA LITERACY NOW,
https://medialiteracynow.org/your-state-legislation/ [https://perma.cc/LHB7-B396] (last
visited Feb. 21, 2020) (for links to state media literacy education legislation); NAT’L ASSOC.
FOR MEDIA LITERACY EDUC., SNAPSHOT 2019: THE STATE OF MEDIA LITERACY EDUCATION
IN THE UNITED STATES 7 (2019), https://namle.net/publications/somlr/ [https://perma.cc/42
59-P3C5] [hereinafter NAMLE, SNAPSHOT 2019].
20
See, e.g., Universities with Courses in News or Media Literacy, CTR. FOR NEWS
EXCELLENCE & ENGAGEMENT, https://www.news-excellence.org/universities-with-coursesin-news-or-media-literacy/ [https://perma.cc/Z9W3-7MY6] (last visited Feb. 21, 2020);
Rosenwald, supra note 11.
21
On Google’s efforts, including its Google News Initiative, see, for example, Kerry
Flynn, How Google-Backed MediaWise Is Teaching Teens Media Literacy, DIGIDAY (Jan.
7, 2019), https://digiday.com/media/google-backed-mediawise-teaching-teens-medialiteracy/ [https://perma.cc/B6RU-28NF]; Sarah Perez, Google’s New Media Literacy
Program Teaches Kids How to Spot Disinformation and Fake News, TECHCRUNCH (Jun. 24,
2019), https://techcrunch.com/2019/06/24/googles-new-media-literacy-program-teacheskids-how-to-spot-disinformation-and-fake-news/ [https://perma.cc/J8AE-FA65]; see also
GOOGLE, HOW GOOGLE FIGHTS DISINFORMATION (2019), https://kstatic.googleusercontent.
com/files/388aa7d18189665e5f5579aef18e181c2d4283fb7b0d4691689dfd1bf92f7ac2ea68
16e09c02eb98d5501b8e5705ead65af653cdf94071c47361821e362da55b [https://perma.cc/
LN3R-FLZH]. Facebook has also joined in this effort by launching the Facebook Journalism
Project, which has funded media literacy education for teens. See, e.g., Campbell Brown,
The Facebook Journalism Project Partners with the News Literacy Project to Expand Its
News Literacy Program for Students, FACEBOOK JOURNALISM PROJECT (Aug. 15, 2018),
https://facebookjournalismproject.com/article/the-facebook-journalism-project-partnerswith-the-news-literacy-project-to-expand-its-news-literacy-classroom-for-students/ [https://
perma.cc/E444-ZBCA]. In addition, Facebook has experimented with fact-checking and
tagging disputed news content online. See, e.g., Fact-Checking on Facebook: What
Publishers Should Know, FACEBOOK (Feb. 25, 2020), https://www.facebook.com/help/pub
lisher/182222309230722 [https://perma.cc/G7P3-8L9S]. Twitter has also enlisted in these
efforts, recently partnering with UNESCO in a media literacy initiative. See generally
TWITTER,
TEACHING
AND
LEARNING
WITH
TWITTER
(2018),
https://about.twitter.com/content/dam/about-twitter/values/twitter-for-good/en/teachinglearning-with-twitter-unesco.pdf [https://perma.cc/C3BQ-TDU-5].
22
See supra note 19.
19
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apparently bipartisan support in both houses of Congress.23 The DCMLA
specifically identifies media literacy education as a response to online
disinformation and attempts by foreign states to destabilize U.S. elections.24 (The
legislation was proposed apparently in response to the findings of the Senate
Intelligence Committee’s report on Russian social media disinformation efforts in
connection with the 2016 presidential election and its recommendations for federal
support for media literacy to “build long term resilience to foreign manipulation of
our democracy.”25) In comments supporting the bill, its sponsors identified
disinformation as a “national security threat,” and argued that “[a]n important part
of safeguarding our country against foreign influence is making sure individual
citizens have the tools to spot that disinformation.”26 If passed, the legislation would
23

See S. 2240, 116th Cong. (2019), https://www.congress.gov/bill/116thcongress/senate-bill/2240/text?r=8&s=1 [https://perma.cc/TK5L-UTDT] and H.R. 4668,
116th Cong. (2019), https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/4668
[https://perma.cc/SDJ2-TLQH].
It should be noted that the House and Senate bills are virtually identical in language
except that the House bill (which, as the October bill, is more recent than the Senate’s July
version): (1) contains specific references to the accessibility of media literacy to “at-risk”
students (see § 2(4)); (2) contains a new Section 4 requiring the Secretary of Education to
establish a Federal Advisory Council “to assist the Secretary in evaluating and awarding
grants under this section 3 and developing and making available to States and local
educational agencies evidence-based model curricula and standards for media literacy
education”; and (3) contains a Section 5 requiring the Government Accountability Office to
submit various reports within 180 days after enactment of the legislation concerning the
media literacy and digital citizenship programs at the state and local levels, media literacy
and digital citizenship competencies among students, and the impact of media literacy and
digital citizenship education on student outcomes.
24
The findings indicating this are contained in Section 2 in both the House and Senate
versions of the bill. See S. 2240, § 2; H.R. 4668, § 2.The legislation-supporting rhetoric styles
the matter as one of national security because guarding against foreign state interference in
domestic elections is envisioned as a central goal of national security.
25
The report concluded that “a public initiative—propelled by federal funding but led
in large part by state and local education institutions—focused on building media literacy
from an early age would help build long-term resilience to foreign manipulation of our
democracy.” S. SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, 116TH CONG., REP. ON RUSSIAN ACTIVE
MEASURES CAMPAIGNS AND INTERFERENCE IN THE 2016 U.S. ELECTION, VOL. 2: RUSSIA’S
USE OF SOCIAL MEDIA WITH ADDITIONAL VIEWS 81 (2019), https://www.intelligence.senate.
gov/sites/default/files/documents/Report_Volume2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UPZ3-6HS5]
[hereinafter SENATE REPORT ON RUSSIAN INTERFERENCE]; see also Maggie Miller, House
Dems Introduce Bill to Fight Social Media Disinformation, THE HILL (Oct. 11, 2019),
https://thehill.com/policy/national-security/465464-house-dems-introduce-bill-to-fightsocial-media-disinformation [https://perma.cc/K3T5-H88P] (describing report’s findings
with respect to Russian disinformation campaign, and recommending “a ‘public initiative’
aimed at promoting ‘critical thinking skills’ to help Americans identify disinformation
online”).
26
Miller, supra note 25.
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authorize the Secretary of Education to create a grant program to help develop digital
and media literacy education for grades K-12.27
The DCMLA defines media literacy broadly, including the ability to evaluate
the credibility of information obtained via various media and to analyze media
content critically.28 The proposed legislation seeks to empower children to identify
online disinformation and to be aware of the ways in which media can influence
them. Despite the broad language employed in parts of the definition, the findings
and most of the definitional provisions suggest a focus on media literacy principally
as inoculation against the impacts of factually false claims.29 This reading of media
literacy does not significantly focus on the media itself as anything more than the
conduit for the spread of disinformation. And perhaps of its apparent origin in the
need to find an antidote to “foreign manipulation of our democracy,”30 the DCMLA
does not address the anti-democratic effects of a domestic campaign of false
information and attacks on the press by the President of the United States himself.
And it is an approach that “put[s] the onus for monitoring media effects on the
audience[.]”31

27
See S. 2240; H.R. 4668; H.R. 4668. Both House and Senate bills provide that state
or local educational agencies receiving grants could use the funds to incorporate media
literacy into existing K-12 curricula, establish media literacy advisory councils to help
develop new curricula, recommend guidelines and best practices in media literacy education,
and expend funds to provide professional training for teachers in media literacy. Both House
and Senate bills define media literacy as “the ability to (A) access relevant and accurate
information through media in a variety of forms; (B) critically analyze media content and the
influences of different forms of media; (C) evaluate the comprehensiveness, relevance,
credibility, authority, and accuracy of information; (D) make educated decisions based on
information obtained from media and digital sources; (E) operate various forms of
technology and digital tools; and (F) reflect on how the use of media and technology may
affect private and public life.” H.R. 4668, § 3(a)(5); S. 2240, § 3(a)(4).
28
See S. 2240; H.R. 4668; H.R. 4668.
29
I do not mean to over-interpret either the narrowness of the disinformation-debunking
goal or the implications of the national security-focused rhetoric deployed in support of the
DCMLA. As noted above, the definition of media literacy (and especially H.R. 4668, §
3(a)(5)(B) & (F) and S. 2240 § 3(a)(4)(B) & (F)) is broader than simple debunking. Similarly,
the call-out to national security may well be a strategic ploy to increase bipartisan support
for the bill rather than a well thought-out choice to limit the scope of media literacy.
30
See SENATE REPORT ON RUSSIAN INTERFERENCE, supra note 25.
31
BULGER & DAVISON, supra note 2, at 15; see also Livingstone, supra note 2.
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II. INCREASING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF TODAY’S MEDIA LITERACY IN LIGHT OF
COGNITIVE BIASES AND AT A TIME OF EVOLVING DISINFORMATION
If media literacy is to be effective even as a technique of skeptical reading, the
first step is to assess and increase the effectiveness of current media literacy
approaches, particularly as they focus on debunking factual mis/disinformation.32
A. Addressing Structural Problems in Existing Tactics
Social scientists and education researchers assert that the effectiveness of media
literacy education legislation has not yet been established empirically.33 One of the
major difficulties besetting media literacy legislation and proposals is that the
concept of media literacy itself has been contested, developed in a variety of separate
disciplines, and subject to limited empirical study.34 In addition, some scholars
identify significant structural problems that stand in the way.35 This does not
32

Of course, effectiveness is a relative notion. Still, it is useful to engage in an analysis
of the costs and likely benefits of the focus on media literacy as an antidote to disinformation.
In application, the idea appears to be to provide the audience with the tools to be able to
evaluate the likely truth of factual allegations. A broader goal could be to understand the
frames, biases, and contexts of news reports.
33
See, e.g., BULGER & DAVISON, supra note 2, at 16–17; Schiffrin, 1939, supra note 2;
Schiffrin, Demand Side, supra note 2.
34
See Osborne, supra note 2, and sources cited therein.
35
See discussion infra notes 34–38 and accompanying text; Schiffrin, Demand Side,
supra note 2. On the education front, for example, a recent report addresses the structural
problems that appear to reduce the effectiveness of state-based media literacy education
initiatives in the U.S. overall. See NAMLE, SNAPSHOT 2019, supra note 19, at 9; cf. JOEL
BREAKSTONE ET AL., STANFORD HISTORY EDUC. GRP., STUDENTS’ CIVIC ONLINE
REASONING: A NATIONAL PORTRAIT 3 (2019), https://purl.stanford.edu/gf151tb4868
[https://perma.cc/75FA-MREB] (detailing a Stanford University report indicating significant
college student inability to distinguish false from true information despite existing media
literacy educational requirements for high schoolers); see also Osborne, supra note 2. Studies
of the effectiveness of media literacy efforts at the K-12 level suggest, inter alia, a need to
improve the education-sustained U.S. commitment and to improve professional training and
diversity. See BULGER & DAVISON, supra note 2. Critics point to the lack of professional
training in media education approaches for teachers as one of the structural problems that
make it hard to conclude that the educational approach has been particularly effective. This
does not even get to the insufficient and variable funding of such media literacy efforts in
education. See, e.g., Schiffrin, Demand Side, supra note 2. One of the important
contributions of pending federal legislation may be a response to that latter concern. Even
more critically, some argue that current educational interpretations of media literacy are
unduly narrow, rest on “crass versions of critical thinking,” and will be unable to solve the
major social problems for which they are proposed. See, e.g., danah boyd, You Think You
Want Media Literacy. . . Do You?, MEDIUM: DATA & SOC’Y: POINTS (Mar. 9, 2018),
https://points.datasociety.net/you-think-you-want-media-literacy-do-you-7cad6af18ec2
[https://perma.cc/U4MC-42RT].
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necessarily suggest promising results from the still-highly-decentralized funding
approach taken by the proposed DCMLA. Moreover, beyond media literacy
requirements in the K-12 educational context, research has also cast doubt on the
ability of audiences to distinguish mis/disinformation online36 and therefore raised
questions about the effectiveness of the various initiatives (undertaken particularly
by the tech platforms) to empower audiences to detect falsity.
Although some take the position that mis/disinformation has little electoral
effect37 and media literacy efforts have not been conclusively shown to be effective,
we should not read too much into such a supposed failure of proof. After all,
attempting to assess effectiveness faces huge measurement problems, not to mention
the inconsistent and inadequate ways in which it has been operationalized, so
existing empirical studies begin from a data disadvantage.38 A bird’s eye view
suggests that even in the educational setting, media literacy has been legislatively
aspirational rather than operationally central. Moreover, social science research has
not offered uniform results with respect to debunking strategies.39
At the same time, critics might assert that not having a clear, consensus
definition of media literacy does present a problem. Unfortunately, it is not enough
to respond that the cornerstone of media literacy is critical thinking,40 because that
36

See, e.g., BREAKSTONE ET AL., supra note 35, at 14–27.
See, e.g., Hunt Allcott & Matthew Gentzkow, Social Media and Fake News in the
2016 Election, 31 J. ECON. PERSP. 211, 232 (2017) (disputing electoral impact of
disinformation in 2016 U.S. presidential election); Andrew Guess et al., Eur. Res. Council,
Selective Exposure to Misinformation: Evidence from the Consumption of Fake News During
the 2016 U.S. Presidential Campaign, at 2–12 (Jan. 9, 2018), https://nordpresse.be/IFC/fakenews-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/5N2T-5AEX] (an early study pushing back against claims
of direct electoral impact).
Still, each of the studies thus far has its limits. See generally Danielle Kurtzleben, Did
Fake News on Facebook Help Elect Trump? Here’s What We Know, NPR (Apr. 11, 2018,
7:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2018/04/11/601323233/6-facts-we-know-about-fake-newsin-the-2016-election [https://perma.cc/H2NV-7TZ4] (reviewing findings and limitations of
fake news studies); see also discussion infra note 127 and accompanying text.
38
See Schiffrin, Demand Side, supra note 2.
39
For example, some argue that even appropriately audience-targeted, fact-based
debunking may well have limitations to the extent that different audiences do not all spread
disinformation because they are unaware of its falsity. But recent empirical work suggests
that large majorities of those who spread disinformation are in fact unaware of its falsity. See
Amy Mitchell et al., Many Americans Say Made-Up News Is a Critical Problem That Needs
to Be Fixed, PEW RES. CTR. (June 5, 2019), https://www.journalism.org/2019/06/05/manyamericans-say-made-up-news-is-a-critical-problem-that-needs-to-be-fixed/ [https://perma.
cc/5DCE-QHNH] (“Of the 52% of Americans who say they have shared made-up news
themselves, a vast majority of them said they didn’t know it was made up when they did
so.”). So at least for those people, effective debunking techniques might well work to reduce
sharing of disinformation.
40
See, e.g., Marin Dell, Fake News, Alternative Facts, and Disinformation: The
Importance of Teaching Media Literacy to Law Students, 35 TOURO L. REV. 619, 643–46
37
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notion is itself an abstract construct as to which people can differ, whose deployment
will vary with circumstances, and which is more a starting point than a conclusion.41
Still, fact-based approaches to media literacy can be improved even without a fullfledged definition (and a broader definition is offered in Part III below).
An interdisciplinary and granular approach to media literacy design—involving
both educators, researchers of all stripes, and technologists, and looking at the larger
political, social and technological context—may help increase the effectiveness of
this antidote to mis/disinformation.42 At a minimum, more sustained and broadlybased empirical research is necessary, and the law should not be deaf to its results.
B. An Interdisciplinary Approach to Media Literacy Design
A reasonable response to the call for regulation and the uncertainty in the social
science literature on the subject is to increase evidence-based awareness about what
kinds of debunking strategies work to change people’s minds about informational
truth and falsity. For this, both close attention to the different audiences for media
literacy, and deep engagement with the findings of cognitive psychologists and other
empirical researchers may be necessary (if not sufficient) conditions for success.43
A reflexive reliance on fact-checking is not sufficient, and new challenges are posed
by the increasing enhancement of technological methods designed to create false
realities.44
1. Matching Debunking Strategies to a Variety of Audiences
The role of age in contemporary American politics in an era of technological
change and media fragmentation has been understudied. Many information literacy
programs are school-based and directed to children. Even the DCMLA bills are
school-focused.45 But many people who are taken in by false information online are
(2019) (arguing that media literacy education be mandatory for law students). Early media
literacy proponents in the U.S. stressed critical thinking and understanding of the broad social
and political context of propaganda. See Schiffrin, Demand Side, supra note 2.
41
It is also important to ensure that a commitment to critical thinking does not become
an avenue for generalized cynicism about truth and trust across the board.
42
See Stephan Lewandowsky et al., Beyond Misinformation: Understanding and
Coping with the “Post-Truth” Era, 6 J. APPLIED RES. MEMORY & COGNITION 353, 362, 365
(2017) (proposing an interdisciplinary “technogition approach” to address “the post-truth
crisis”).
43
Of course, just as lawyers, media literacy educators, and technology platforms must
take close account of the findings of social scientists, the various social scientists in different
disciplines studying these issues must also work more closely together and engage more
directly with each other’s work. And to the extent that research findings conflict or studies
are limited or incomplete, resources should be spent on expanding and deepening the work.
44
See infra Sections II.B.3. & II.C.
45
See supra note 27.
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already adults. Although the results seem counterintuitive, recent data suggest that
older Americans are more likely to forward “fake news” online.46 If so, then the
empirical focus on childhood learners and even college students may be too narrow
and too long-term a response to the problem of online mis/disinformation today.
Alternatively, anecdotal observation suggests that younger adults appear to be more
skeptical than older people about what they read online.47 It may be that older
adults—who grew up in a news environment characterized by editorial gatekeeping
and assume the continuation of editorial curation now as well—are more likely to
believe what they read online.48
Moreover, there is reason to challenge the breadth of the relevant audience
categories: neither “children” nor “adults” is a homogeneous grouping.
Kindergarteners, tweens, 17-year-olds who are almost voting citizens, and 85-yearold retirees are fundamentally different in cognitive abilities, judgment, and level of
skepticism about information to which they are exposed. Among adults as well, there
is a broad spectrum with respect to political interest and commitment, and
predispositions with respect to beliefs and interpretive templates. People self-select
what they want to hear, and they ignore and interpret information at will, often on
the basis of unchallenged predispositions, beliefs, and group memberships.49 And
context matters: different contexts influence the degree to which audience members
believe information.50
The variety of audiences for fake news detection would suggest that a single
type of media literacy tool would not likely be optimally effective. A variety of
debunking methods might serve different audiences, at different times, and with
46

See Andrew Guess et al., Less than You Think: Prevalence and Predictors of Fake
News Dissemination on Facebook, 5 SCI. ADVANCES 1 (Jan. 9, 2019),
https://advances.sciencemag.org/content/5/1/eaau4586#F1
[https://perma.cc/Y6QTYN4U]; Laura Hazard Owen, Old People Are Most Likely to Share Fake News on Facebook.
They’re Also Facebook’s Fastest-Growing U.S. Audience, NEIMANLAB (Jan. 11, 2019, 7:00
AM), https://www.niemanlab.org/2019/01/old-people-are-most-likely-to-share-fake-newson-facebook-theyre-also-facebooks-fastest-growing-u-s-audience/ [https://perma.cc/R7C7EGD2]; Schiffrin, Demand Side, supra note 2, and sources cited therein.
47
See Guess et al., supra note 37, at S10–S14.
48
I thank RonNell Andersen Jones for a comment on this point during our symposium
panel. Another possibility is that older users’ digital literacy skills lag behind those of
younger people online. See Casey Newton, People Older than 65 Share the Most Fake News,
a New Study Finds, THE VERGE (Jan. 9, 2019, 2:00 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2019/
1/9/18174631/old-people-fake-news-facebook-share-nyu-princeton [https://perma.cc/N9EV
-KY9E].
49
See, e.g., Gordon Pennycook & David Rand, Why Do People Fall for Fake News?,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 19, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/19/opinion/sunday/fakenews.html [https://perma.cc/T8YD-W83J] (describing social science research on people’s
susceptibility to believing fake news and strategic mis/disinformation).
50
Cf. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, #REPUBLIC: DIVIDED DEMOCRACY IN THE AGE OF SOCIAL
MEDIA 98–136 (2017) (arguing, inter alia, that echo chambers or filter bubbles will tend to
increase the extremism of the views expressed).
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respect to different kinds of news.51 Perhaps, then, media literacy approaches should
differ depending, inter alia, on age, credulity, technological adeptness, and degree
of partisanship of the variety of audiences. For example, experience with increasing
information skepticism through the use of digital games might provide a fruitful
avenue, especially for young people.52 For older and less digitally savvy audiences,
the focus could be an emphasis on tools for critical reading online (although query
whether memory problems could complicate this kind of suggestion53), as well as
instruction in the structure and operations of the media today—so that such
audiences understand more clearly the decline of the gatekeeper/editorial function
online. Admittedly, some of these criteria are less objectively verifiable and harder
to identify than others, but the principal point is that what works may differ for
different audiences and should, therefore, be specifically studied empirically.
2. Lessons from the Social Sciences
Media literacy programs should work closely with cognitive psychologists and
other social scientists to figure out which debunking strategies are likely to be
effective, for which audiences, and when. One of the most promising aspects of
legislation like the DCMLA is that it calls for empirical assessments of media
literacy education initiatives.54 To what extent are current media literacy initiatives
taking account of work in the main fields addressing media literacy? How much do
current media literacy efforts rely on credible social and cognitive psychology

51

See Owen, supra note 46 (discussing the need to focus fake news solutions on older
people and not just digitally savvy youth); see also Newton, supra note 48 (paraphrasing
political scientist Matthew Gentzkow that “the new study’s findings about age could help
tech platforms design more effective tools”).
52
Such games could be used for a variety of debunking ends, but one helpful use tested
so far has been the use of games to understand the ways in which attention can be
manipulated. See, e.g., Jon Roozenbeek & Sander van der Linden, Fake News Game Confers
Psychological Resistance Against Online Misinformation, 5 PALGRAVE COMM. No. 65 at 7
(June 25, 2019), https://www.nature.com/articles/s41599-019-0279-9#citeas [https://perma.
cc/A6FG-HMBA]; Lindsay Grace & Bob Hone, Factitious: Large Scale Computer Game to
Fight Fake News and Improve News Literacy, in CHI CONFERENCE ON HUMAN FACTORS IN
COMPUTING SYSTEMS EXTENDED ABSTRACTS (2019), http://professorgrace.com/documents
/Report_On_Fake_News_Game_And_Demographic_Performance.pdf [https://perma.cc/D7
9R-B7ZK].
53
But see Daniel J. Levitin, Everyone Knows Memory Fails as You Age. But Everyone
Is Wrong., N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 10, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/10/opinion/
sunday/age-memory.html [https://perma.cc/7VYU-5K4N].
54
See, e.g., Digital Citizenship and Media Literacy Act, H.R. 4668, 116th Cong. §§
3(e),
5
(2019),
https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/4668
[https://perma.cc/SDJ2-TLQH] (requiring, respectively, reporting on impact by eligible
entities and by the Government Accounting Office).
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literature mapping how humans believe and detect falsity?55 And how clear are the
lessons of social science?
A recent report by scholars for Data & Society importantly calls for an interdisciplinary approach to the question of media literacy.56 Although empirical
research has begun to explore the question of what will debunk online
mis/disinformation, much still needs to be studied, and there does not yet seem to be
a stable consensus in the social science literature.57 Still, a few things have become
clear. People’s mental processes are subject to a variety of heuristics and cognitive
biases—such as confirmation bias, familiarity- and fluency-biases, repetition bias,
illusory truth effect, motivated reasoning—that make it difficult to design effective
correctives to false information.58 For example, correcting false information by
repeating it in the course of providing true counter-information may well backfire
or boomerang and reinforce the original false claim.59 And people often have a “bias
blind spot” as a result of which they can recognize others’ biases while remaining
unaware of their own.60 Moreover, “belief echoes” based on false information can
55

Recently, the Data & Society Report has turned its focus on how to improve the
empirical data available to assess media literacy efforts and recommended a national
database and cross-disciplinary collaboration. See BULGER & DAVISON, supra note 2, at 4.
56
See BULGER & DAVISON, supra note 2, at 4.
57
See Nicholas Dias et al., Emphasizing Publishers Does Not Effectively Reduce
Susceptibility to Misinformation on Social Media, 1 HARV. KENNEDY SCH.
MISINFORMATION REV. 1, 2–3 (2020), https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2020/01/V2_researcharticle_publishers_jan29.pdf [https://perma.cc/G6ECDM6H] (warning, in the context of publisher identification models, of “the importance of
social media platforms and civil society organizations rigorously assessing the impacts of
interventions (source-based and otherwise), rather than [implementing] them based on
intuitive appeal”).
58
See, e.g., Xiaodan Lou et al., Observatory on Social Media, Ind. U., Bloomington,
Manipulating the Online Marketplace of Ideas 2 (Apr. 12, 2020) (unpublished manuscript),
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1907.06130.pdf [https://perma.cc/BF7Z-UM8T] (“[S]ocial media users
have in recent years become victims of manipulation by various means . . . . These kinds of
manipulation exploit a complex interplay of socio-cognitive, political, and algorithmic
biases.”).
59
See, e.g., Brendan Nyhan & Jason Reifler, When Corrections Fail: The Persistence
of Political Misperceptions, 32 POL. BEHAV. 303, 303 (2010), https://doi.org/10.1007/s111
09-010-9112-2 [https://perma.cc/93L8-TFBC].
60
See, e.g., Prasad Chandrashekar et al., Free-Will and Self-Other Asymmetries in
Perceived Bias and Shortcomings: Replications of the Bias Blind Spot and Extensions
Linking to Free Will Beliefs (April 2020) (preprint of early stage research, ResearchGate),
10.13140/RG.2.2.19878.16961/2, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/331431431_
Agency_and_self-other_asymmetries_in_perceived_bias_and_shortcomings_Replications
_of_the_Bias_Blind_Spot_and_extensions_linking_to_free_will_beliefs
[permalink
unavailable] (asserting reproduction of original 2002 study finding “bias blind spot”); Emily
Pronin et al., The Bias Blind Spot: Perceptions of Bias in Self Versus Others, 28(3)
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 369, 370 (2001), https://doi.org/10.1177/01461672
02286008 [https://perma.cc/L7CK-KQHN].
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affect people’s political attitudes even though they recognize the falsity of the
information.61
Of course, people are not fungible, the cognitive biases described above are
generalizations, and the empirical research is neither complete nor wholly
consistent.62 Moreover, identifying these cognitive biases enables the design of
debunking strategies that can try to bypass them. So, for example, to the extent that
people believe news they receive from people they trust without further examining
the sources of the news stories, then focusing upstream might be helpful, especially
if the upstream disseminator is not consciously weaponizing falsehood for strategic
political purposes. To the extent that sharing false information leads to reputational
harm in the user’s social network, then reading slowly and critically might become
more of a social norm in online networks. To the extent that celebrities help to
propagate mis/disinformation, helping “influencers” to be more skeptical about what
they post can have a beneficial funneling effect. Moreover, because people are more
trusting of stories they receive from sources they perceive as credible,63 and because
they prefer to receive information that confirms their existing views,64 research
61

See M. Anne Britt et al., A Reasoned Approach to Dealing with Fake News, 6(1)
POL’Y INSIGHTS FROM THE BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 94, 96 (2019); Alice E. Marwick, Why Do
People Share Fake News? A Sociotechnical Model of Media Effects, 2 GEO. L. TECH. REV.
474, 486–87 (2018). In the analogous context of beliefs in conspiracies, political scientists
have found that information appears to have limited success in reversing conspiratorial
beliefs for those of conspiratorial predispositions, although only 25% of people are found to
have predispositions to believe conspiracy theories. See, e.g., Joseph E. Uscinski, The Study
of Conspiracy Theories, ARGUMENTA 1, 9 (2017), https://www.argumenta.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/10/Argumenta-Joseph-Uscinski-The-Study-of-Conspiracy-Theories.
pdf [https://perma.cc/9S3G-5BA9]; see also Emily Thorson, Belief Echoes: The Persistent
Effects of Corrected Misinformation, 33 POL. COMM. 460 (2016), https://www.tandfonline.
com/doi/abs/10.1080/10584609.2015.1102187 [https://perma.cc/JHB5-J6BM]; Joseph E.
Uscinski et al., What Drives Conspiratorial Beliefs? The Role of Informational Cues and
Predispositions, 69(1) POL. RES. Q. 57, 59 (2016).
62
For example, findings as to the backfire or boomerang effect may depend on group
characteristics and how the correction is delivered. See Richard Bennett, Does Fact Checking
Work on Fake News?, HIGH TECH F. (Dec. 20, 2018), https://hightechforum.org/does-factchecking-work-on-fake-news/ [https://perma.cc/UHZ5-LBAY]. Moreover, one large study
found that “[e]vidence of factual backfire is far more tenuous than prior research suggests.”
Thomas Wood & Ethan Porter, The Elusive Backfire Effect: Mass Attitudes’ Steadfast
Factual Adherence, 41 POL. BEHAV. 135, 135 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-0189443-y [https://perma.cc/UM9V-93L2].
63
See, e.g., David Sterrett et al., Who Shared It? Deciding What News to Trust on Social
Media, 7 DIGITAL JOURNALISM 783, 784–85 (2019).
64
See, e.g., Jason C. Coronel et al., Investigating the Generation and Spread of
Numerical Misinformation: A Combined Eye Movement Monitoring and Social
Transmission
Approach,
46
HUM.
COMM.
RES.
25,
25
(2020),
https://doi.org/10.1093/hcr/hqz012 [https://perma.cc/43AF-3NSV] (reporting findings that
“individuals misremembered numerical information in a manner consistent with their
schemas, and that person-to-person transmission can exacerbate these memory errors”);
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suggests that receiving fact corrections from “surprising validators” could be a
useful debunking strategy.65 Even those who hold strong beliefs may be nudged into
a stance of “critical loyalty” with effective media literacy education, researchers
have found.66 Some argue for “pre-bunking”—that is, warning audiences in advance
of bad information to which they will be exposed.67 In addition, even if a small
number of corrections would not dislodge a false belief, can a large enough number
of challenges make people doubt whether they have made a bad decision? Moreover,
even if people share false information online despite doubts as to its truth for reasons
that have less to do with ignorance than with partisanship or predisposition, effective
media literacy for the information-consuming public could well reduce the social
currency of false information and act as a deterrent both to its initial dissemination
and its further diffusion.
To the extent that “people fall for fake news because they fail to think [and] not
because they think in a motivated or identity-protective way . . . interventions that
are directed at making the public more thoughtful consumers of news media may
have promise.”68 Thus, another possible solution is to prompt users to be in a
deliberative mindset when confronted with information.69 In order to reduce the
Laura Hazard Owen, People Who Are Given Correct Information Still Misremember It to Fit
Their Own Beliefs, NIEMANLAB (Dec. 13, 2019, 7:50 AM), https://www.niemanlab.org/2019
/12/people-who-are-given-correct-information-still-misremember-it-to-fit-their-own-beliefs
/ [https://perma.cc/L8M5-U8EV] (reporting on study).
65
See, e.g., Edward Glaeser & Cass R. Sunstein, Does More Speech Correct
Falsehoods?, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. 65, 67 (2014) (coining ther term “surprising validators” and
arguing that if antecedent beliefs are sharply divided, “[m]essages need to come from sources
that are seen as credible to the relevant audience” because “when information that is
unwelcome (in the sense that it casts doubt on one’s prior beliefs) comes from someone who
is highly credible and difficult to dismiss, a change in view is more likely”).
66
See Rosenwald, supra note 11 (citing to study); Joseph Kahne & Benjamin Bowyer,
Educating for Democracy in a Partisan Age: Confronting the Challenges of Motivated
Reasoning and Misinformation, 54 AM. EDUC. RES. J. 3, 3 (2016),
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.3102/0002831216679817 [https://perma.cc/5ARTUVT9] (finding that media literacy education improved judgments of accuracy more than
political knowledge did).
67
See Marc Daalder, Why Do We Fall for Fake News?, NEWSROOM (last updated Jan.
20, 2020), https://www.newsroom.co.nz/2019/11/06/896279/why-do-people-fall-for-fakenews [https://perma.cc/P25L-TAJX]; Schiffrin, Demand Side, supra note 2.
68
Gordon Pennycook & David G. Rand, Lazy, Not Biased: Susceptibility to Partisan
Fake News Is Better Explained by Lack of Reasoning than by Motivated Reasoning, 188
COGNITION 39, 48–49 (2018), https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0010
02771830163X [https://perma.cc/WG8Y-CG24].
69
In a study specifically examining the effect of prompting investors to be in a
deliberative mindset when looking at financial information, researchers report finding that
those who were so prompted were less likely to believe false market information. See
Stephanie M. Grant et al., Can a Deliberative Mindset Prompt Reduce Investors’ Reliance
on Fake News? 20 (Aug. 28, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
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“continued influence effect,” for example, an intervention could be made before a
user is faced with mis/disinformation to “reduce[] the strength of the information
encoding . . . [or] ‘information stickiness.’”70 A prompt to put users in a more
deliberative mindset is that kind of intervention. For example, if social media
platforms could prompt users to be in a deliberative mindset before reading news,
System 2 thinking could be triggered.71 Research could help determine which
prompts work best.72 It should be noted that the prompt does not have to be
particularly closely tied to the particular issue as to which the user is faced with
mis/disinformation.73
In any event, the remaining uncertainty in the relevant social science argues in
favor of exploring a variety of corrective mechanisms without the adoption of a
single one-size-fits-all combination. One thing that does seem clear from the social
science literature as it is developing is that the data do not support the conclusion
that fashioning media literacy interventions in a careful way will inevitably fail.
Having observed cognitive biases (such as confirmation bias and motivated
reasoning) does not mean that the attempt to fight factual mis/disinformation is, by
definition, doomed. What the complexity of the issue suggests, though, is that we
should not proceed simply by intuition.
3. The Complexity of Relying on Fact-checking
Fact-checking has become a principal tool for media literacy, both in schoolbased media literacy programs and for general online audiences. The contemporary
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3444228 [https://perma.cc/5VWV-W4C6]. While research on this
has focused on investors, whose processing of financial information would predispose them
to a more deliberative than hedonic mindset, it is possible that deployment of such prompts
in the social media context could work as well.
70
Id. at 7, 11.
71
See Keith E. Stanovich & Richard F. West, Individual Differences in Reasoning:
Implications for the Rationality Debate?, 23 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 645, 658–59 (2000)
(labeling Systems 1 and 2). Psychologists (dual process theorists) distinguish two modes of
thinking—System 1 and System 2—with System 1 referring to rapid, automatic, unconscious
and associative thinking, and System 2 referring to thinking that is conscious, requires effort,
deliberation, analysis and logic. Id. Not unexpectedly, research suggests that System 2
demands more cognitive capacity than System 1. Id. See generally also DANIEL KAHNEMAN,
THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2011) (outlining the two systems of thinking). Again, not
unexpectedly, people are reluctant to engage in System 2 thinking. See John M. Newman,
Attention Markets and the Law 27 (July 23, 2019) (unpublished manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3423487 [permalink unavailable].
Admittedly, “human attention is scarce,” and is susceptible to overload and depletion—
which both make people susceptible to priming and persuasion. Id. at 28–30.
72
With respect to financial news, for example, the Grant article suggests that “a news
outlet could ask all readers to consider the pros and cons of an issue prior to providing access
to the article.” Grant et al., supra note 69, at 7.
73
Id.
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fact-checking industry reflects significant growth: there are now 195 fact-checking
outfits (as opposed to 44 five years ago).74
Fact-checking has attracted both adherents75 and skeptics.76 Adherents suggest
that, when designed appropriately, fact-checking can help audiences assess factual
claims critically.77 Fact-checking—by platforms, independent outfits, or other
players in the media environment—seems like a natural tool to help audiences
identify and avoid falling for mis/disinformation.
By contrast, skeptics of maximal reliance on fact-checking argue that there are
both structural and behavioral problems with fact-checking as an antidote to
mis/disinformation. One problem is that not everything fact-checkers purport to
check is amenable to a binary, true/false decision.78 Criticisms also include concerns
that fact-checkers treat predictions about the future as if they are checkable facts,79
that they do not hew to systematic selection criteria, allowing cherry-picking and
selection bias,80 that they do not have clear standards by which they purport to
distinguish false from true or account for degrees of falsity (thereby leading to
inconsistent results, especially with respect to ambiguous statements),81 that they are
politically biased,82 and that their processes lead to false equivalencies among
74

See Emily Bell, The Fact-Check Industry, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. (2019),
https://www.cjr.org/special_report/fact-check-industry-twitter.php [https://perma.cc/2ABGSJFE] (describing Duke University Reporter Lab census indicating the numbers in text).
75
In itself, the burgeoning industry of fact-checkers and their use by news organizations
evidences broad reliance on fact-checking as an appropriate response to falsity in the news
environment. See Bell, supra note 74. Google, Facebook, and non-profit foundations are
funding fact-checking philanthropy. Id.
76
See generally, e.g., Bell, supra note 74; Marwick, supra note 61, at 508; Andrew
Moshirnia, Who Will Check the Checkers?: False Factcheckers and Memetic
Misinformation, 2020 UTAH L. REV. 1029; Joseph E. Uscinski & Ryden W. Butler, The
Epistemology of Fact Checking, 25 CRITICAL REV. 162, 162 (2013); Joseph E. Uscinski, The
Epistemology of Fact Checking (Is Still Naïve: Rejoinder to Amazeen), 27 CRITICAL REV.
243, 249 (2015) [hereinafter Uscinski, Still Naïve].
77
See, e.g., Alexander Agadjanian et al., Counting the Pinocchios: The Effect of
Summary Fact-Checking Data on Perceived Accuracy and Favorability of Politicians, 6
RES. & POL. 1 (2019) (concluding that summary fact-checking—which “presents an
overview of the fact-checking ratings for a politician” as opposed to focusing on the truth or
falsity of a single statement—might be a useful tool both to promote critical reading and also
to deter some false statements by politicians).
78
See, e.g., Uscinski & Butler, supra note 76, at 163.
79
Id. at 170–72.
80
Id. at 164–68, 172–75.
81
See, e.g., Chloe Lim, Checking How Fact-Checkers Check, 5 RES. & POL. 1, 1 (2018)
(evaluating two major fact-checkers and finding that fact-checking is “difficult, and that
validation is challenging . . . and [sometimes] strategic ambiguity of politicians may impede
the fact-checking movement’s goals”).
82
See, e.g., id. at 1 (explaining that fact-checkers are often ignored “by simply
dismissing the fact-checking community as politically biased”); David Harsanyi, ‘Impartial’
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habitual liars and candidates whose statements may sometimes be misleading.83
Fact-checking groups do not justify what facts they choose to check and why they
exclude other facts and contexts as irrelevant to their inquiries about truth.84 Factchecking is difficult (especially for anything beyond outright falsehoods), and
unsurprisingly, fact-checkers “disagree more than one might suppose.”85 In addition,
the rise of automated fact-checking raises questions about journalistic comfort with
the algorithmic vetting of information for truth value.86 The fact-checking process
becomes further complicated as fake news moves from public platforms like
Facebook and Twitter to closed systems like WhatsApp.87 Further, the
appropriateness of looking to self-appointed fact-checkers to establish truth has been
questioned both by audience members88 and by researchers concerned about
legitimacy and the “partnership press” resulting from teaming up by news
organizations and technology companies.89 Some claim that fact-checkers have been
shown to be politically partisan and therefore untrustworthy as neutral authorities to
establish truth.90 Third-party fact-checkers have complained about the lack of

Fact Checkers Are Revealing Their Partisanship Against Trump, N.Y. POST (Feb. 9, 2019),
https://nypost.com/2019/02/09/impartial-fact-checkers-are-revealing-their-partisanshipagainst-trump/ [https://perma.cc/8EDJ-G7GJ].
83
See, e.g., Michael Calderone, Democrats Decry Double Standard in Fact Checking,
POLITICO (Sept. 11, 2019), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/09/11/democrats-factchecking-1489135 [https://perma.cc/7GYX-RJU5].
84
Lim, supra note 81, at 1; Uscinski, Still Naive, supra note 76, at 249.
85
Lim, supra note 81, at 1.
86
See Bell, supra note 74. To the extent that small-scale entrepreneurship might be
thought to be an avenue for diversity in AI content moderation, however, research suggests
that successful automated disinformation solutions will likely be acquired by the major
platforms, reducing long-term diversity of approaches. See ANYA SCHIFFRIN, GERMAN
MARSHALL FUND OF THE U.S., AI STARTUPS & THE FIGHT AGAINST ONLINE
DISINFORMATION 2 (2019), http://www.gmfus.org/publications/ai-startups-and-fightagainst-online-disinformation [https://perma.cc/5CPY-A4L9].
87
See Bell, supra note 74.
88
See, e.g., Bill Adair, Beyond the Truth-O-Meter, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV (July 24,
2018), https://www.cjr.org/first_person/beyond-the-truth-o-meter.php [https://perma.cc/3W
HH-DZBA]. Skepticism about fact-checker bias appears to be greater among conservatives,
but liberals have also complained about the inclusion of what they characterize as politically
partisan fact-checking outfits. See, e.g., Erik Wemple, Study: Conservatives Despise the
Fact-Checking Industry, WASH. POST (June 9, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
blogs/erik-wemple/wp/2017/06/09/study-conservatives-despise-the-fact-checking-industry/
[https://perma.cc/7FJX-MHLH].
89
On such “partnership press” developments, see Mike Annanny, Checking in with the
Facebook Fact-Checking Partnership, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. (Apr. 4, 2018),
https://www.cjr.org/tow_center/facebook-fact-checking-partnerships.php [https://perma.cc
/KA86-7W4S]; see also Bell, supra note 74.
90
This has been most common among conservatives. See, e.g., Adair, supra note 88.
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transparency in their relationships with social media sites such as Facebook.91 It is
far from clear that people who come across news articles on social media will see
negative fact-checks of those articles.92 More broadly, journalists themselves have
begun to argue recently that facts do not establish truth and that we shouldn’t assume
that correcting false facts necessarily provides truth.93
Another damning criticism of the fact-checking enterprise is the assertion that
people believe things that are congruent with their predispositions and worldviews,
even if they know the facts are, in fact, untrue.94
Even though correcting false facts does not necessarily establish truth,
however, it can surely make at least some audiences more skeptical of untruths, at
least sometimes. Sophisticated and self-conscious approaches to fact-checking,
therefore, especially when transparent about selection processes, can still play a
useful role—at least with regard to certain sorts of claims. And the reality of
motivated reasoning and the fact that people do not easily change their world views
in response to fact-debunking information do not mean either that there is no
possibility of change in response to factual correction, or that bona fide efforts to
engage in fact-checking should be rejected out of hand.
The reality is that the fact-checking landscape today is complex. A 2018 report
by the Columbia Journalism Review describes a partnership, which developed in
2016, among Facebook and a number of news and fact-checking organizations.95
That partnership is described as both providing the benefit of a joint enterprise of
independent fact-checkers and entailing excessive and non-transparent control by
Facebook.96 Moreover, despite Big Tech’s language lauding fact-checking efforts,
91

See, e.g., Bell, supra note 74; see also FULL FACT, REPORT ON THE FACEBOOK THIRD
PARTY FACT CHECKING PROGRAMME 6 (2019), https://fullfact.org/media/uploads/tpfc-q1q22019.pdf [https://perma.cc/S39B-MD87] (UK fact-checker report on Facebook initiative)
[hereinafter FULL FACT REPORT].
92
See Anya Schiffrin, Is Fact-Checking Working?, MEDIA POWER MONITOR (Aug. 30,
2019), http://mediapowermonitor.com/content/fact-checking-working [https://perma.cc/5X
X5-XC29].
93
See, e.g., Phillips, supra note 8.
94
See Kyle Pope, Beyond Facts, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. (2019),
https://www.cjr.org/special_report/beyond-facts-disinformation.php [https://perma.cc/77JM
-98HF]; see also Marwick, supra note 61; Katherine Clayton et al., Real Solutions for Fake
News?, POL. BEHAV. (2019), https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11109-019-09533-0
[https://perma.cc/B5M4-PTLQ]. But see note 39, supra (citing to evidence that many people
disseminate disinformation unknowingly).
95
Mike Ananny, Checking in with the Facebook Fact-Checking Partnership, COLUM.
JOURNALISM REV. (Apr. 4, 2018), https://www.cjr.org/tow_center/facebook-fact-checkingpartnerships.php [https://perma.cc/SV3V-A4TY] [hereinafter Ananny, Checking in]
(describing the partnership, which consisted of Facebook, ABC News, Associated Press,
FactCheck.org, PolitiFact, and Snopes).
96
Id.; see also Mike Ananny, The Partnership Press: Lessons for Platform-Publisher
Collaborations as Facebook and News Outlets Team to Fight Misinformation, TOW CENTER
FOR DIGITAL JOURNALISM (2018), https://www.cjr.org/tow_center_reports/partnership-
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the reality is that the platforms have not allocated a significant amount of money to
fact-checking (raising questions about their commitment to such projects in fact).97
Furthermore, studies suggest that how fact-checking results are presented may
be important in the impact of fact-checking. An alternative suggested by some
researchers is the use of source ratings—ratings of information sources rather than
the truth of particular factual assertions.98 One study recently found that negative
source ratings reflected in summary indicators reduced social media users’ beliefs
in the articles and that detailed rating information both increased and decreased
belief, depending on whether it was negative or positive.99 Even tagging by
platforms and fact-checking outfits of falsity for individual statements and stories
can be done more (or less) effectively, depending on the design.100 At the same time,
press-facebook-news-outlets-team-fight-misinformation.php
[https://perma.cc/FKC8V6BN] [hereinafter Ananny, The Partnership Press]; HELEN LEE BOUYGUES, REBOOT
FOUND., FIGHTING FAKE NEWS: LESSONS FROM THE INFORMATION WARS 19 (2019),
https://reboot-foundation.org/wp-content/uploads/_docs/Fake-News-Report.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/5AZH-U36E]; FULL FACT REPORT, supra note 91 (UK fact-checker assessement of
Facebook third party fact-checking program).
97
See Bell, supra note 74.
98
Such source ratings do not speak to the believability of the specific article at issue;
rather, they indicate positive or negative ratings for the source of the original article,
developed on the basis of reliability of prior articles. See, e.g., Antino Kim et al., Combating
Fake News on Social Media with Source Ratings: The Effects of User and Expert Reputation
Ratings, 36 J. MGMT. INFO. SYS., 931 (2019) (describing the boundaries to the effectiveness
of the source ratings approach); see also Patricia Moravec et al., Do You Really Know If It’s
True? How Asking Users to Rate Stories Affects Belief in Fake News on Social Media, HAW.
INT’L CONF SYS. SCI. 6602, 6603 (2019) (finding that having to rate articles and sources
pushed even non-expert source raters to think more critically about all the articles they read,
not only those they rated); GALLUP/KNIGHT FOUNDATION, ASSESSING THE EFFECT OF NEWS
SOURCE RATINGS ON NEWS CONTENT 1 (2018), https://knightfoundation.org/reports/assess
ing-the-effect-of-news-source-ratings-on-news-content/?utm_source=link_newsv9&utm_
campaign=item_236123&utm_medium=copy2018
[https://perma.cc/C5G5-K9MT]
(finding that perceived accuracy increased with green source cue associated with
Gallup/Knight news source rating system and that the source tool was effective across the
political spectrum).
99
See Kim et al., supra note 98, at 932 (finding prevalence of confirmation bias).
Recent publicly-posted unpublished works appear to support the point. See, e.g., Patricia L.
Moravec et al., Fake News on Social Media: People Believe What They Want to Believe
When It Makes No Sense At All (Nov. 6, 2018) (unpublished manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3269541 [permalink unavailable];
Jorge Mejia et al., Black Lies vs. White Lies: Information Asymmetry and Bias in Factchecking
Platforms
36
(June
18,
2019)
(unpublished
manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3401284 [permalink unavailable]
(finding that fact-checking can impact social perception of speakers and that providing full
analysis of the fact-checking evaluation can mitigate race and gender bias in the perceived
morality and competence of the speaker accused of lying).
100
See, e.g., Clayton et al., supra note 94.
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fact-checking methodologies and processes—fact-checkers’ use of heuristics, such
as lateral reading—could be used to improve traditional media literacy education
methods that rely, for example, on credibility checklists.101 The variety of factchecking initiatives should themselves be the subject of analysis and assessment.102
Fact-checking, then, is neither completely suspect nor the killer solution to the
problem of mis/disinformation. In attempting to combat mis/disinformation, media
literacy approaches cannot be exhausted by reliance on fact-checking. They should
not rely on the fact-checking industry or the social media platforms’ efforts
uncritically and without accountability. At the same time, the investment of much
more significant funding for such fact-checking efforts by Big Tech (as well as
improvements in algorithmic approaches to fact-checking) could increase the
robustness of such efforts. When accompanied by much greater transparency about
such initiatives (as well as limited expectations), there is at least the possibility that
fact-checking could be a useful element in a broader media literacy regime. The
practical question is whether the platforms will cooperate.103
C. The Political “Deepfake” and Evolving Technological Challenges
Even if attention to social science data can help to improve the effectiveness of
traditional, critical-thinking-based media literacy approaches, and even if factchecking can be effective, technological challenges and evolution in disinformation
techniques present difficult challenges for traditional approaches to media literacy
going forward. For example, “deepfake” technology has become increasingly

101

See generally Sam Wineburg & Sarah McGraw, Lateral Reading: Reading Less and
Learning More When Evaluating Digital Information (Stan. Hist. Educ. Group, Working
Paper No. 2017.A1, 2017), https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/5b26/9628f4dc29b514dfcb0b5e
429e49fc0dae6d.pdf?_ga=2.64278639.139022754.1578718493-1096048913.1576449900
[https://perma.cc/5ZT2-37KR] (describing and criticizing checklist approach). Lateral
reading refers to a fact-checking approach in which the reader does not evaluate a website’s
reliability by staying on and assessing the content of the site, but rather “leav[es] a site after
a quick scan, opening up new browser tabs along the screen’s horizontal axis to judge the
credibility of the original site.” Id. at 1.
102
See Nathan Walter et al., Fact-Checking: A Meta-analysis of What Works and for
Whom, 37 POLITICAL COMM. 350, 351–56 (2020).
103
One could expect that they might be more amenable to increasing the amount of
money spent on fact-checking than to opening any windows into their proprietary algorithms.
On the platforms’ hesitations to provide informational access to researchers, see infra note
110. The various social media platforms’ different approaches to fact-checking political ads
suggests that there might be variation here as well. See, e.g., Factbox: How Social Media
Services Handle Political Ads, REUTERS (Jan. 9, 2020, 10:15 AM), https://www.reuters.com
/article/us-usa-election-advertising-factbox/factbox-how-social-media-services-handle-polit
ical-ads-idUSKBN1Z824O [https://perma.cc/3NRU-DQ4H] (describing social media
differences on the subject).
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technically sophisticated and has crossed the border from porn into politics.104 If
false and manipulated visual information becomes increasingly common, how can
the traditional tools of critical reading and analysis work to distinguish the false from
the true?105 And even beyond the deepfake problem itself, if increasingly
sophisticated data mining and psychometric user profiling analysis can lead to
microtargeting, there is the possibility that messages can bypass the rational mind in
104
See Holly Kathleen Hall, Deepfake Videos: When Seeing Isn’t Believing, 27 CATH.
U. J. L. & TECH. 51, 57 (2018); Levi, supra note 4, at n.57; Tom Simonite, Prepare for the
Deepfake Era, WIRED (Oct. 6, 2019, 8:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/preparedeepfake-era-web-video/ [https://perma.cc/L8H7-VZUS]; Mika Westerlund, The
Emergence of Deepfake Technology: A Review, 9 TECH. INNOV. MGMT. REV. 39, 39 (2019).
The term “deepfake” refers to highly realistic but AI-created fake video or audio. See James
Vincent, Why We Need a Better Definition of ‘Deepfake,’ THE VERGE (May 22, 2018, 2:53
PM), https://www.theverge.com/2018/5/22/17380306/deepfake-definition-ai-manipulationfake-news [https://perma.cc/RW62-U7HQ]. For recent scholarly articles discussing the
threat of deepfake technology to democracy, see for example, Mary Anne Franks & Ari Ezra
Waldman, Sex, Lies & Videotape: Deepfakes and Free Speech Delusions, 78 MD. L. REV.
892 (2019); Robert Chesney & Danielle K. Citron, Deep Fakes: A Looming Crisis for
Privacy, Democracy, and National Security, 107 CAL. L. REV. 1753 (2019).
105
See, e.g., Drew Harwell, Top AI Researchers Race to Detect ‘Deepfake’ Videos: ‘We
Are Outgunned,’ WASH. POST (June 12, 2019, 2:44 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
technology/2019/06/12/top-ai-researchers-race-detect-deepfake-videos-we-are-outgunned/
[https://perma.cc/X556-QT5D]; see also Bob Moser, Interference 2020, COLUM.
JOURNALISM REV. (2019), https://www.cjr.org/special_report/interference-election2020.php [https://perma.cc/9Q6R-KC4P] (discussing the “sleeper effect” of visual
disinformation).
Some suggest that media literacy techniques should be sufficient to address the
deepfakes problem by engendering a critical distance. See David Goldberg, Responding to
Fake News, 47 SW. L. REV. 417, 433 (2018). But the fact that audiences may be aware that
deepfakes exist does not mean that they will have the tools to challenge what they see in any
given image. Recent studies suggest that visual fakes have more sticking power in audience
recall. See Cuihua Shen et al., Fake Images: The Effects of Source, Intermediary, and Digital
Media Literacy on Contextual Assessment of Image Credibility Online, 21(2) NEW MEDIA &
SOCIETY 438, 438–463 (and sources cited therein) (2019) (describing, inter alia, damage
done by manipulated imagery). This suggests that media literacy efforts should be
specifically tailored to aid in visual debunking, in addition to efforts to promote deepfake
detection and content authentication. See generally Jeffrey Westling, Are Deep Fakes a
Shallow Concern? A Critical Analysis of the Likely Societal Reaction to Deep Fakes (Jul.
25, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3
426174 [https://perma.cc/D8QJ-CJQA] (discussing how society will adapt to deepfakes with
improved deepfake detection and media literacy for video); see also Nicholas Diakopoulos
& Deborah G. Johnson, Anticipating and Addressing the Ethical Implications of Deepfakes
in the Context of Elections, NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y (forthcoming 2020–21) (manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3474183
[https://perma.cc/5JNTESMW] (describing deepfake methodology and arguing for appropriate media literacy
education in response).
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order to trigger immediate emotional responses, and can disrupt the audience’s
ability to recruit text-based media literacy tools in the service of skeptical reading.
How should media literacy evolve to address these evolving challenges?106
As a result of evolving deepfake technology, a more tech-savvy, visuallyfocused approach may be needed as an adjunct to the other media literacy
techniques.107 Another helpful possibility would be the circulation of guides, for
journalists and others, on how to detect image- or audio-falsity.108 Obviously, much
of the work in this area will be left to institutions—such as research universities and
technologists, but also to the digital platforms themselves.109 Big Tech has the
technical capacity to supplement these research university initiatives. But the
difficulty with imagining a partnership between platforms and technologists to
respond to technologically sophisticated disinformation techniques is that social
media and other tech platforms have not been in the habit of sharing their algorithmic
information with independent researchers.110 This may be an area, then, in which the
106

See Levi, supra note 4, at 249 & n.57, 254 (noting difficulty of debunking deepfakes
and concerns about psychometric approaches to online messaging).
107
See Shen et al., supra note 105, at 457–58. Shen et al. recently found that Internet
skills, photo-editing experience, and social media use were good predictors of image
credibility evaluation (and perhaps better than most social and heuristic cues of online
credibility (such as source and intermediary trustworthiness), although that finding may
result from research design). Id. at 458. Thus, participants “can still be discerning consumers
of digital images,” and a visually technical focus for media literacy interventions designed
to address video disinformation might help them be so. Id.
108
See, e.g., Michael Edison Hayden, A Guide to Open Source Intelligence (OSINT),
TOW CTR. FOR DIGITAL JOURNALISM (June 7, 2019), https://www.cjr.org/tow_center_reports
/guide-to-osint-and-hostile-communities.php [https://perma.cc/5P9S-2XSD]. On the work
of the Partnership for AI as part of the Deepfake Detection Challenge, see, for example,
Bruce Sterling, On the Subject of Weaponized Deep-Fakes, WIRED (Jan. 14, 2020),
https://www.wired.com/beyond-the-beyond/2020/01/subject-weaponized-deep-fakes/ [https
://perma.cc/V5DF-CPEP]; see also Jennifer Kavanagh et al., Fighting Disinformation
Online: A Database of Web Tools, RAND CORP., https://www.rand.org/pubs/tools/TL323.
html [https://perma.cc/V5DF-CPEP].
109
Recently, social media companies have adopted policies banning deepfakes. See,
e.g., David McCabe & Davey Alba, Facebook Says It Will Ban ‘Deepfakes,’ N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 7, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/07/technology/facebook-says-it-will-bandeepfakes.html [https://perma.cc/5UDF-3CKM]; Sarah Perez, Twitter Drafts a Deepfake
Policy That Would Label and Warn, But Not Always Remove, Manipulated Media,
TECHCRUNCH (Nov. 11, 2019), https://techcrunch.com/2019/11/11/twitter-drafts-adeepfake-policy-that-would-label-and-warn-but-not-remove-manipulated-media/ [https://pe
rma.cc/6JNV-RQBD] (detailing the proposed Twitter deepfake policy).
110
See, e.g., Marco Bastos & Shawn T. Walker, Facebook’s Data Lockdown Is a
Disaster for Academic Researchers, THE CONVERSATION (Apr. 11, 2018),
http://theconversation.com/facebooks-data-lockdown-is-a-disaster-for-academic-research
ers-94533 [https://perma.cc/8QC3-CT8W]. While there was a moment when Facebook
seemed more open to sharing data with researchers, see, for example, Robbie Gonzales,
Facebook Is Giving Scientists Its Data to Fight Misinformation, WIRED (May 29, 2018),
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need to collaborate to fight against increasingly seamless visual disinformation
should serve as a goad to the platforms to provide more research transparency.
In addition to the political deepfake, yet another evolving technological
challenge for media literacy efforts is the increasing ability of social media platforms
to personalize the content served to individuals. Especially if researchers are not
granted access to the personalization algorithms for online users, it will be very
difficult for those researchers to design appropriately contextual reliabilityassessment techniques.111 This is yet one more argument for expanded researcher
access to the platforms’ decision-making algorithms.
Finally, some early research suggests that the increasing sophistication of visual
disinformation tools should expand the focus of media literacy interventions in the
visual space.112 To the extent that digital visual literacy—such as familiarity with
photo-editing and manipulating digital visual media—seems more effective than
traditional debunking techniques in reducing the credibility of visual fakes, then
media literacy interventions need to expand to address that kind of literacy in order
to increase effectiveness.
III. ENLARGING THE GOALS AND TARGETS OF MEDIA LITERACY BEYOND
THE NATIONAL SECURITY FRAME
The previous section sought to describe ways in which media literacy programs
could more robustly promote audience empowerment to improve factual debunking.
But because the audience empowerment rubric is still often defined in terms of
methods designed to help assess the credibility of specific news articles or bits of
information, it sets too modest an objective for what is needed from media literacy
today.
One critical underlying problem is the reality of public distrust in the press—
an attitude that has existed for some time, but that has been increasingly weaponized
https://www.wired.com/story/facebook-is-giving-scientists-its-data-to-fight-misinformation
[https://perma.cc/AV63-G7QK], current reports suggest that this initiative is failing. See,
e.g., Davey Alba, Ahead of 2020, Facebook Falls Short on Plan to Share Data on
Disinformation, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 29, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/29/techno
logy/facebook-disinformation.html [https://perma.cc/8724-P2QL]; Gillian Tett, Why
Facebook’s Data-Sharing Initiative Is Faltering, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2019),
https://www.ft.com/content/98b5385e-0025-11ea-b7bc-f3fa4e77dd47 [https://perma.cc/2H
P6-MBR6]. Facebook has argued that privacy-related concerns make broad information
sharing very difficult. See Matthew Ingram, Silicon Valley’s Stonewalling, COLUM.
JOURNALISM REV. (2019), https://www.cjr.org/special_report/silicon-valley-cambridgeanalytica.php [https://perma.cc/4LAW-A4TW] (discussing social media platform
hesitations resulting from prior exposure of user data by Facebook to Cambridge Analytica
and the impact of GDPR privacy rules).
111
See BULGER & DAVISON, supra note 2, at 17. The platforms rely, inter alia, on
privacy arguments in response to requests for researcher access.
112
See, e.g., Shen, supra note 105, at 439–40.

2020]

MEDIA LITERACY

967

by President Trump and the Republican party leadership.113 Media literacy policy
could explore four ways to address public distrust—two focused on audiences and
two on the press itself.
It is perhaps because of the deeper question of institutional legitimacy that
media literacy as a tool to combat disinformation becomes most critical. It is not
unreasonable to wonder whether disinformation online really presents such
outcome-determinative electoral effects as to warrant massive expenditures of
resources devoted to (inevitably fruitless) attempts to eradicate it.114 But that is not
the principal point. Even if disinformation did not directly lead to Trump’s election
in 2016, for example, the broader democratic and other harms of political attacks on
the press are sufficient, in themselves, to justify attempts to adopt a broader version
of media literacy.115 And there is evidence of high levels of concern among
audiences about mis/disinformation causing an increase in reliance on “reputable”
sources of news.116
A. Expanded Audience Literacy
This Essay suggests two approaches to expand audience media literacy in the
service of enhancing trust. First, some headway could be made if news consumers
could better understand the processes of news reporting and the structure of the
media ecosystem (including the news/opinion distinction, how to distinguish
between the different social media news feeds, and the different social media
approaches to news).117 Media literacy should also turn audiences inward and
include revealing to them both the ways in which their decisionmaking is subject to
cognitive biases, and the strategies used by enterprising purveyors of destabilizing
falsehoods to manipulate their reactions in targeted ways.118

113

See, e.g., Levi, supra note 4, at 257–62.
See discussion supra note 37.
115
Scholars point to effects such as sowing distrust and suppressing voter turnout. See,
e.g., Schiffrin, Demand Side, supra note 2 (and sources cited therein). Beyond the directly
political context, researchers seem to agree that disinformation has had pernicious effects in
areas such as public health—for example, through the dissemination of false information by
the anti-vaccine community. See, e.g., Lawrence O. Gostin et al., The Public Health Crisis
of Underimmunisation: A Global Plan of Action, 20 LANCET INFECTIOUS DISEASES e11, e14
(2020), https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1473309919305584 [https://per
ma.cc/C8B4-W7BA].
116
See, e.g., NIC NEWMAN ET AL., REUTERS INSTITUTE DIGITAL NEWS REPORT 2019,
REUTERS INST. FOR THE STUDY OF JOURNALISM 10 (2019), https://reutersinstitute.politics.
ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/2019-06/DNR_2019_FINAL_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3MAN838S].
117
See discussion infra Section III.A.1.
118
See discussion infra Section III.A.2.
114
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1. Promoting Transparency About Press Processes to Encourage Public Trust
Recent studies show that the public at large is not well-informed about the
journalistic process and the distinctions between factual and opinion statements in
the news.119 Given the extent to which large percentages of the American public
appear to believe Trump’s delegitimizing frame of the institutional press as the
“enemy” and as itself “fake news,” 120 recent empirical data suggest that a significant
portion of the public does not see the institutional press as a fundamental bulwark
of democracy.121
Both of these developments are extremely dangerous. If people don’t
understand the realities of press function, they can all too easily assume an
inaccurate degree of corruption and bad faith on the part of journalistic organizations
with whose opinion pages they do not agree. And if the public increasingly distrusts
the institution of the press, particularly when the legislature is quiescent, then that
can unduly enhance executive power in ways dangerous for democracy and the
public interest. If, on the other hand, media literacy initiatives were broadened to
target public ignorance about the operations and democratic role of the press, there
might be some amelioration of the failure of public trust.122 Recent research suggests
119

See Amy Mitchell et al., Distinguishing Between Factual and Opinion Statements
in the News, PEW RES. CTR. (June 18, 2018), https://www.journalism.org/2018/06/18/disting
uishing-between-factual-and-opinion-statements-in-the-news/
[https://perma.cc/G47HCYZG].
120
See, e.g., Jeffrey Gottfried et al., Trusting the News Media in the Trump Era, PEW
RES. CTR. (Dec. 12, 2019), https://www.journalism.org/2019/12/12/trusting-the-newsmedia-in-the-trump-era/ [https://perma.cc/83RF-J4ZM].
121
On public distrust of the press, see, for example, Mark Jurkowitz et al., U.S. Media
Polarization and the 2020 Election: A Nation Divided, PEW RES. CTR. (Jan. 24, 2020),
https://www.journalism.org/2020/01/24/u-s-media-polarization-and-the-2020-election-anation-divided/ [https://perma.cc/3AYQ-Q6FH]; Gottfried et al., supra note 120.
122
See Colleen Shalby, Journalists Become Media Literacy Teachers, NIEMANLAB,
https://www.niemanlab.org/2019/12/journalists-become-media-literacy-teachers/?utm_
source=Daily+Lab+email+list&utm_campaign=8c5e856044-dailylabemail3&utm_medium
=email&utm_term=0_d68264fd5e-8c5e856044-396145757
[https://perma.cc/QR4CQDUF] (last visited Feb. 21, 2020). Some remind us that academic research is inconclusive
on how media and institutions can rebuild credibility, the extent to which trust depends on
journalism practices, and whether “specific” trust can become “diffuse” trust. See, e.g.,
ANYA SCHIFFRIN ET AL., OPEN SOCIETY FOUNDATIONS, BRIDGING THE GAP: REBUILDING
CITIZEN TRUST IN MEDIA 7 (2017), https://drive.google.com/file/d/1VRIMmdmvsRp2r2q7
ttexe3Ccn36hc3oz/view [https://perma.cc/7ZY3-M3M9]. Still, the BRIDGING THE GAP
report shows that media organizations are all trying different ways of building trust,
including revealing journalism practices and interacting with their audiences, and believe
that “delivering accurate information is a way of gaining credibility in a world of
diminisihing trust.” Id. at Executive Summary.
Recently, Michael Schudson, eminent sociologist of journalism, has argued that
although “[n]ews organizations should have to explain themselves . . .”—both with respect
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that knowledge about the structure of the evolving media ecosystem and the “nuts
and bolts of everyday journalism” can help dispel mis/disinformation and reduce
belief in conspiracy theories.123
So, one expanded goal of media literacy should be to help reverse the distrust
of the press. These structural and institutional literacy initiatives should, inter alia:
(1) explain, in detail, process issues such as news organizations’ approaches to
newsgathering, editorial norms, sourcing policies (including anonymous sourcing);
(2) clearly sketch (to the extent possible) the distinction between hard news and
opinion; (3) provide the public with a sense of the cost and difficulties of
accountability journalism; (4) explain the true costs of operating a newspaper and
the death spiral of the traditional media’s economic model; and (5) explain the
complex relationships of journalism and social media/tech platforms today.124 In
to processes and even perspectives and values—it is not clear that such transparency would
bolster public trust. Michael Schudson, The Fall, Rise, and Fall of Media Trust, COLUM.
JOURNALISM REV. (Winter 2019), https://www.cjr.org/special_report/the-fall-rise-and-fallof-media-trust.php [https://perma.cc/GAE3-FMWY]. While Schudson admits that greater
transparency about how they produce the news could help, he anticipates that it could do so
only “a tiny bit.” Id. In his view, “[i]t will not matter how many ‘meet the reporters’ events
news organizations sponsor or how much they itemize where every bit of information in a
news story came from. What people don’t like about the media is its implicit or explicit
criticism of their heroes.” Id.
Although I would not argue with Schudson that economic and social inequality are
likely the key factors leading to public distrust in government and institutions, an analysis of
what leads to—or at least reinforces—public distrust in the press should not discount the
demonization of the mainstream press by President Trump and his administration, not to
mention the modern media’s own errors and “passion for play-by-play news.” Id. To the
extent that transparency about journalistic processes can help at least some members of the
audience avoid or question knee-jerk assumptions of bad faith and strategic lying by the press
writ large, generalized distrust can be replaced with a “trust but verify” attitude for at least
some parts of the public. Not distrusting is quite different from affirmatively trusting. If a
broad and properly calibrated media literacy campaign can help reduce distrust, even if it
does not affirmatively build trust, we are in a better position than when the delegitimizing
rhetoric of the President leads to trust only in the Executive. Schudson himself admits that
journalists’ professional values—seeking truth, holding government publicly accountable,
believing that government officials are public officials with obligations to the public—
“would resonate with readers, if only they were articulated.” Id. If so, it is worth an
experiment.
123
Jackie Spinner, Study: Educating News Consumers About the Media Can Curb
Conspiracy Theory Appeal, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. (Dec. 20, 2017), https://www.cjr.org/
united_states_project/news-media-literacy-conspiracy-theory.php [https://perma.cc/KW2EBLC8].
124
On this point about transparency, this Essay is in good scholarly company. Michael
Schudson recently argued that news organizations should have to “communicate the
difference between the news department and the editorial page (more than a quarter of
Americans do not understand the distinction); to show how they gather their news; to clarify
why they sometimes cannot divulge their sources; to explain why it matters that nearly all
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addition, news organizations might experiment with ways of providing journalistic
context for individual stories as well.125 Well-designed attempts to reverse ignorance
might be helpful in mitigating distrust.126 Recent research shows, though, that
increasing publisher information in connection with headlines of news stories online
has no meaningful impact on evaluations of headline accuracy. 127 Still, the evidence
shows that members of the news-consuming public want to know more about how
the news is made.128
There is of course the possibility (as suggested to me informally by a journalist)
that journalists might fear too much transparency and might be concerned that a clear
and accurate understanding of the processes of journalism might actually decrease
rather than increase trust. It is doubtless true that exposure to the imperfections of
any profession’s processes could undermine trust, that journalists do not always
adhere to their profession’s ethical principles, that news media today span a broad
spectrum with respect to norms and practices, and that in a polarized political
environment, revelation of news organizations’ points of view or errors could
magnify and reify distrust by opponents. But significant segments of the public have

scientific authorities believe that the most important element in global warming is that
humans contribute to it. It may also be time for journalists to acknowledge that they write
from a set of values, not simply from a disinterested effort at truth . . .” Schudson, supra note
122; see also Schiffrin, Demand Side, supra note 2 (describing the Institute for Propoganda
Analysis’s recommendation in the 1930s that journalists “build relationships with their
communities to explain the importance of journalism” and the modern growth of grassroots
efforts to explain journalism in the classroom).
125
See, e.g., Hanaa’ Tameez, Maybe Greater Transparency Can Increase Trust in
News—But Readers Have to Find Your Transparency First, NIEMANLAB (Jan. 30, 2020,
11:29 AM), https://www.niemanlab.org/2020/01/maybe-greater-transparency-can-increasetrust-in-news-but-readers-have-to-find-your-transparency-first/
[https://perma.cc/49LYNGMG] (reporting that some newsrooms are “testing out ways to let readers see more
context around the story—whether that’s showing how the story was produced, how it fits
into a larger narrative, or the editorial values that back the journalism”).
Admittedly, a recent study indicates that most readers did not notice the ‘Behind our
reporting/Behind the Story’ boxes that participating newspapers included to provide context
for particular stories. Id. Nevertheless, most readers shown a “Behind the Story” card on its
own, not in the context of a story, “said that the card would increase their trust in a news
organization.” These findings suggest that the issue is proper page placement and design,
rather than reader disinterest in story context. Id.
126
See Shalby, supra note 122.
127
See Nicholas Dias et al., Emphasizing Publishers Does Not Effectively Reduce
Susceptibility to Misinformation on Social Media, MISINFORMATION REV. (Jan. 14, 2020),
https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/emphasizing-publishers-does-not-reducemisinformation/ [https://perma.cc/QC5A-QS97].
128
See, e.g., Kourtney Bitterly, Transparency Isn’t Just a Desire, It’s an Expectation,
NIEMANLAB,
https://www.niemanlab.org/2019/12/transparency-isnt-just-a-desire-its-anexpectation/ [https://perma.cc/49LY-NGMG] (last visited Feb. 21, 2020).
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already adopted a stance of overall generalized distrust with respect to media.129
Enhancement of public understanding of journalistic best practices for mainstream
media could help counteract reflexive and presumptive distrust, even if it did not
ensure trust, for at least some of the audience. Being able to see which news
organizations comply with professional standards—and, most importantly, how
frequently and how well—might also help audiences engage in reliability
comparisons.
What to make of the argument that audiences are already so convinced of the
partisan character of the press and generally disinclined to believe in reportorial
objectivity, neutrality, truth, and good faith that such attempts to educate them on
journalistic processes will inevitably fail? While doubtless true to a great degree,
such an argument paints with too broad a brush. Admittedly, some recent empirical
studies show that Republicans are more likely to distrust mainstream news outlets
than Democrats and that even within Republicans, distrust of media tracks approval
of Trump.130 But this does not mean that, after exposure to clear, accurate, and
complete information about the process of reporting, some percentage of that
population might not moderate its level of distrust (or at least develop “critical
loyalty” with regard to information from otherwise trusted sources).131 Shifts in trust
129

See, e.g., Jurkowitz et al., supra note 121 (describing both public distrust of the
media and the partisan divide in which media are trusted).
130
See, e.g., Gottfried et al., supra note 120 (reporting findings that party affiliation is
linked closely to how people view media); Jurkowitz et al., supra note 121.
131
See supra note 65. Admittedly, some researchers have found that people spread
“fake news” for novelty and reasons of emotional response rather than ignorance as to its
falsity. See, e.g., Marwick, supra note 61, at 508 (fake news shared because people’s
“worldviews are shaped by their social positions and their deep beliefs, which are often both
partisan and polarized”); Soroush Vosoughi et al., The Spread of True and False News
Online, 359 SCIENCE 1146, 1149–50 (2018); Bertin Martens et al., Joint Res. Ctr., Eur.
Comm’n, The Digital Transformation of News Media and the Rise of Disinformation and
Fake News, at 6, JRC Digital Econ. Working Paper No. 2018-02 (Apr. 2018),
https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/sites/jrcsh/files/jrc111529.pdf [https://perma.cc/8XHX-S2JN]. But
see Mitchell et al., supra note 39. Social scientists also contend that people believe
information that tracks their prior beliefs and that being told that information is not true does
not necessarily lead them to change their beliefs. See, e.g., R. Kelly Garrett et al., Epistemic
Beliefs’ Role in Promoting Misperceptions and Conspiracist Ideation, PLOS ONE (Sept. 18,
2017),
https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0184733
[https://perma.cc/CC53-4T6V]; see also sources cited in Section II.B.2.
However, audiences may be more skeptical if confronted online with assertions that
what they are reading is false. See, e.g., boyd, supra note 35. Moreover, the studies noted
above take a narrow snapshot of what people believe and should not be interpreted as proving
a binary and unchanging decisional process. Decisions about what to believe, whether any
given piece of inconsistent information is sufficiently significant to upend deeply held and
clear views of the world (or identity or status-based affiliations that militate toward
acceptance of commonly held views), and what institutions to trust are complex and
doubtless subject to change and influence over time, as well as variable, for example,
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need not be measured only with respect to the predispositions of the core Trump
base; providing the more analytically-minded with tools to assess press function
could have positive effects on the less ideologically-fixed segment of the audience.
And to the extent that at least in 2016, the right-wing media was materially guiltier
of spreading disinformation,132 it is possible that consumers of conservative media
could become more skeptical of those news sources if they were allowed to see under
the hood.133 Such responses might also depend on the kind of information in
question, whether with respect to subject or degree of controversy. Especially if
news organizations did more to distinguish between their hard news and opinion
depending on subject. They surely also vary depending on epistemic beliefs, such as whether
the people at issue rely more on intuition or empirical evidence to validate truth claims. See,
e.g., Garrett et al., supra. Moreover, to the extent that conspiratorial beliefs persist because
they are “boosted” by politicians and others repeating falsehoods for strategic appeal to their
bases, see Dietram Schaufele & Nicole Krause, Science Audiences, Misinformation, and
Fake News, PNAS (Apr. 16, 2019), https://www.pnas.org/content/116/16/7662
[https://perma.cc/NCL3-ARBR], then a reduction of such boosting might have an
ameliorative effect. As Jack Balkin has explained, two interrelated tactics for sowing distrust
are gaslighting and propaganda. Comments by Jack Balkin, Media & Information Law Panel,
Danger, Drama & Self-Defeat: Diagnosing What Faces “The Press,” AALS ANNUAL
MEETING 2020 (Jan. 3, 2020), https://soundcloud.com/aals-2/section-on-communicationmedia-and-information-law-danger-drama-and-self-defeat-diagnosing-what-faces-the-press
/s-WU9ob [https://perma.cc/QQ5S-TKNM]. The point of these techniques is to inject doubt
into the discourse and decrease claims of press authority both to criticize governmental
behavior and to establish facts. Surfacing the manipulative character of such techniques may
in itself inject some counter-doubt into the environment of doubt.
More importantly, the transparency and education recommended here is as to
journalistic processes, rather than the truth or falsity of—or belief in—the substance of
individual bits of factual information. Even if confirmation bias and motivated reasoning
play a significant (if not determinative) role in whether people choose not to disbelieve
(whether they actually affirmatively believe) facts they are told are untrue, my goal for media
literacy interventions here is to focus on the legitimation of the press as a democratically
significant actor, rather than on the accuracy of specific items of information. This does not
mean, of course, that those who are convinced that the N.Y. Times is untrustworthy because
of its unadmitted liberal slant or those who believe that Fox News is not in fact a journalistic
outlet will change their views if the N.Y. Times or Fox News explain more about their
processes (though, for some, sufficient transparency on the part of the particular press organ
both as to its processes and its editorial norms and partisan leanings might be seen as
positive). It does assume, though, that there is currently a world beyond those outlets that
have already been categorized on the basis of political partisanship. There are surely news
organizations whose partisanship is not as clearly assumed by the audience and as to whose
processes enhanced public information might actually increase trust (in journalistic good
faith, if not in the credibility of each piece of reported information).
132
See, e.g., YOCHAI BENKLER ET AL., NETWORK PROPAGANDA: MANIPULATION,
DISINFORMATION, AND RADICALIZATION IN AMERICAN POLITICS 105 (2018).
133
Admittedly, social science reports of cognitive bias and motivated reasoning might
suggest otherwise, but there is also evidence that such biases can be circumvented.
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coverage, the public might be able to have more faith in the institutions of the
press.134 Moreover, recent studies show that people do not trust the news they access
through social media.135 So perhaps a public education campaign that distinguishes
the work of news organizations from the news policies of social media platforms
could help audiences better titrate their distrust.
Finally, if contemporary political problems are due less to ideological
partisanship per se than to generalized, longstanding anti-establishment attitudes on
the part of the non-elite voting public, then a concern about party-based, ideological
close-mindedness should be less worrisome for the viability of a media literacy
approach.136 Understanding the conflict through this dimension suggests that
spreading the word about the press’s professional routines might have an impact on
some people with anti-establishment views.137
134

See Jeffrey Gottfried & Elizabeth Grieco, Younger Americans Are Better than Older
Americans at Telling Factual News Statements from Opinions, PEW RES. CTR. (Oct. 23,
2018), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/10/23/younger-americans-are-betterthan-older-americans-at-telling-factual-news-statements-from-opinions/ [https://perma.cc/
JU5H-QU9X].
In contrast, some argue that the distinction between hard news and opinion is
inevitably—and properly—fuzzy, and that point of view (political and otherwise) is
inevitable in reporting. To those thinkers, then, the only thing that can properly be asked of
the press is transparency as to point of view. See, e.g., Jay Rosen, The View from Nowhere:
Questions and Answers, PRESSTHINK (Nov. 10, 2010, 2:04 AM), http://pressthink.org/2010
/11/the-view-from-nowhere-questions-and-answers/
[https://perma.cc/29NQ-Q6TF]
(criticizing “the view from nowhere”). The position in text is not inconsistent with that view.
In addition, it might be argued that it would help if social media more consistently
reaffirmed that distinction as well. The platforms’ economic model thus far, however, keyed
as it has been to engagement over other editorial commitments, leaves some observers
skeptical that they have an incentive to do so.
135
See, e.g., Elisa Shearer & Elizabeth Grieco, Americans Are Wary of the Role Social
Media Sites Play in Delivering the News, PEW RES. CTR. (Oct. 2, 2019),
https://www.journalism.org/2019/10/02/americans-are-wary-of-the-role-social-media-sitesplay-in-delivering-the-news/ [https://perma.cc/JPU6-J4JM].
136
On partisan innocence, see generally, for example, DONALD R. KINDER & NATHAN
P. KALMOE, NEITHER LIBERAL NOR CONSERVATIVE: IDEOLOGICAL INNOCENCE IN THE
AMERICAN PUBLIC (2017); SAMARA KLAR & YANNA KRUPNIKOV, INDEPENDENT POLITICS:
HOW AMERICAN DISDAIN FOR PARTIES LEADS TO POLITICAL INACTION (2016). On antiestablishment attitudes, see generally, for example, KATHERINE J. CRAMER, THE POLITICS OF
RESENTMENT: RURAL CONSCIOUSNESS IN WISCONSIN AND THE RISE OF SCOTT WALKER
(2016); RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE PARANOID STYLE IN AMERICAN POLITICS (1964);
ROBERT EDWARDS LANE, POLITICAL IDEOLOGY: WHY THE AMERICAN COMMON MAN
BELIEVES WHAT HE DOES (1962); Edward G. Carmines et al., Ideological Heterogeneity and
the Rise of Donald Trump, 14 THE FORUM 385, 386 (2016).
137
Jan-Willem van Prooijen, Empowerment as a Tool to Reduce Belief in Conspiracy
Theories, in CONSPIRACY THEORIES AND THE PEOPLE WHO BELIEVE THEM 432, 432–42
(Joseph E. Uscinski ed., 2018) (discussing how procedural justice allows people to evaluate
authorities and the quality of their procedures, which can lessen belief in conspiracy
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Attention to transparency design and operationalization could also enhance the
effectiveness of a process-transparency strategy.138 To the extent that the way in
which the press communicates about its processes with the audience can influence
the impact of the communicated content, thoughtfully designed transparency
initiatives could affect outcomes.
Furthermore, in addition to transparency about professional standards, this
Essay recommends transparency as to matters such as ownership or point of view of
news distributors. Admittedly, and again as suggested to me informally by a
journalist, recognition of the consolidation of the media ecosystem might undermine
audience confidence. On the other hand, while it is possible that more disclosure of
this kind could decrease trust, it is also possible that shining light into the formerly
obscure could increase the public’s confidence in its ability to assess media behavior.
Indeed, the possibility of enhanced oversight associated with increased public
transparency might influence standards and norms applied by the consolidated
entities themselves. The obligation to be publicly transparent about press practices
and professional norms may well have positive impacts on press behavior. This
might lead to better compliance by the press itself, at least to some degree, with the
norms and processes that it has professed to the public. The possibility of public
shaming on the ground that an institution has not complied with its own promises
can be a useful tool for promoting behavior consistent with expressed norms.
Moreover, to the extent that a push toward professional transparency will result in a
segmented media ecosystem, with institutions arrayed on a spectrum of transparency
about their processes, branding for trust may create opportunities for more
knowledgeable decisions by the public on institutional trust.139
theories); Stephanie Craft et al., News Media Literacy and Conspiracy Theory Endorsement,
2(4) COMMUNICATION AND THE PUBLIC 388, 388–401 (2017).
138
For example, journalist accounts indicate that audience trust in the press in other
countries is associated in part with reporters going out into the community and talking with
the public about their work. See, e.g., SCHIFFRIN ET AL., supra note 122, at 39.
139
Another possible concern about transparency is that such approaches are too
uncertain and indirect to solve the problems of information pollution. On this view, a focus
on transparency—whose benefits have not been empirically proven—could turn reform
efforts away from effective and direct government regulation. But transparency does not
preclude other regulatory reforms if it is but one part of a multi-pronged approach.
Admittedly, multi-pronged strategies increase transaction and coordination costs and,
possibly, enhance the likelihood of delay, but those are not good enough reasons to preclude
potentially promising initiatives. This is particularly so when direct regulation is likely to
face strategic political and judicial challenges. Since the most constitutionally defensible
types of regulatory interventions are likely to focus on media structure and ownership, or
feature transparency rather than direct attempts to regulate content anyway, it is at best
unclear whether government regulation would in fact do much more than the well-designed
process-transparency approach recommended here. Although the proposed Honest Ads Act,
for example, is designed to address foreign election meddling, it simply imposes funding
disclosure and ad archiving requirements on Internet platforms in connection with political
ads. See Patrick B. Pexton, Graham, Klobuchar Introduce Internet Ads Bill to Boost
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2. Enhancing Public Knowledge About Attention Markets, Disinformation
Techniques, and Cognitive Bias
In addition to increased transparency about the nature and goals of journalistic
processes themselves, audiences would benefit from a better understanding of the
shifting contours of the modern news and information environment (which has
evolved considerably in the past decade), the evolving disinformation techniques to
which they are subject, and the cognitive biases to which humans are susceptible.140
Drilling down, they should also understand more clearly the operations of attention
markets,141 the varying interests of the numerous players in the modern
informational ecosystem,142 the evolving ways in which disinformation diffuses
online, and the ways in which the operation of their own mental processes make
them susceptible to manipulation and erroneous belief.
Further transparency, even with respect to the disinformation-debunking
industry, would likely be helpful. One of the key elements of such transparency—
both for the public and for fact-checkers and news organizations—would be
increased transparency by Facebook (at least to researchers) about its disinformation
processes and fact-checking partnerships.143 The public’s understanding of news
Transparency, ROLL CALL (May 8, 2019), https://www.rollcall.com/2019/05/08/grahamklobuchar-introduce-internet-ads-bill-to-boost-transparency/
[https://perma.cc/7VRLZTH3]. Even this type of approach has been subject to constitutional and policy critique.
See, e.g., Bradley A. Smith et al., Honest Ads Act Is False Advertising, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 13,
2019),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/honest-ads-act-is-false-advertising-11570995764
[https://perma.cc/VPA5-ASKT] (also reporting successful constitutional challenge brought
against Maryland’s recently-adopted political ad disclosure requirements).
140
See, e.g., John Gramlich, 10 Facts About Americans and Facebook, PEW RES. CTR.
(May 16, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/05/16/facts-about-americansand-facebook/ [https://perma.cc/7WTV-UG8C]; Emily A. Vogels & Monica Anderson,
Americans and Digital Knowledge, PEW RE. CTR. (Oct. 9, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.
org/internet/2019/10/09/americans-and-digital-knowledge/
[https://perma.cc/Q7K8A3KU]; cf. Erik Ugland, Expanding Media Law and Policy Education: Confronting Power,
Defining Freedom, Awakening Participation, 24 COMM. L. & POL’Y 271, 272–273 (2019)
(arguing for media law and policy education in universities).
141
For recent work on attention markets and antitrust, see generally, for example,
Newman, supra note 71; Tim Wu, Blind Spot: The Attention Economy and the Law, 82
ANTITRUST L.J. 771 (2019).
142
See, e.g., Erin C. Carroll, Platforms and the Fall of the Fourth Estate: Looking
Beyond the First Amendment to Protect Watchdog Journalism, MD. L. REV. (forthcoming
2020) (sketching varying incentives of participants in the “Networked Press”).
143
See Ananny, Checking in, supra note 95; Ananny, The Partnership Press, supra
note 96. At a minimum, very significant transparency problems are posed by Facebook’s
apparently extensive use of nondisclosure agreements (NDAs) to prevent researchers and
media analysts from discovering any information about its disinformation-debunking
partnerships and efforts. Ananny, Checking in, supra note 95; Ananny, The Partnership
Press, supra note 96; see also Carroll, supra note 142 (discussing platforms’ practice of

976

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 4

operations and digital attention markets should also include increased
familiarization with the relationships between news organizations and the big digital
platforms.144 And attention should be paid to the evolutionary aspects of
disinformation dissemination online (such as the apparent platform shift of
disinformation from Facebook to Twitter).145
Finally, some researchers have recently argued for the need to teach audiences
epistemic vigilance.146 They recommend that the public be made more aware of the
memory and belief biases that may affect how they process information and leave
them open to informational manipulation.147 To the extent that audiences recognize
the ways in which their responses can be manipulated by those who know how to
trigger cognitive biases in order to weaponize mis/disinformation for their own ends,
they can inculcate awareness. Nobody wants to see herself as a puppet dancing to
someone else’s tune.148
There are of course dangers to this aspect of media education. One problem is
a concern about increasing, rather than decreasing, public distrust and cynicism.149
System 2 thinking is hard and takes attention.150 When people go online, they may
providing limited access to information to researchers and journalists); Ingram, supra note
110 (addressing both Facebook and Twitter failures with respect to access).
144
See, e.g., Jonathan Albright et al., Friend and Foe: The Platform Press at the Heart
of Journalism, TOW CTR. FOR DIGITAL JOURNALISM (Jun. 14, 2018), https://www.cjr.org/
tow_center_reports/the-platform-press-at-the-heart-of-journalism.php [https://perma.cc/D6
3R-VKHN]; Emily Bell & Taylor Owen, The Platform Press: How Silicon Valley
Reengineered Journalism, TOW CTR. FOR DIGITAL JOURNALISM (Mar. 29, 2017),
https://www.cjr.org/tow_center_reports/platform-press-how-silicon-valley-reengineeredjournalism.php#executive-summary [https://perma.cc/RPR8-857G].
145
See Hunt Allcott et al., Trends in the Diffusion of Misinformation on Social Media,
6 RES. & POL. 1, 7 (2019), https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/205316801984
8554 [https://perma.cc/Y6T4-6G4T] (indicating that “the magnitude of the misinformation
problem on Facebook has declined since its peak.”); see also Schiffrin, Demand Side, supra
note 2 (describing 1930s Institute for Propaganda Analysis’s media literacy approach as
calling for a public articulation of propagandist techniques to arm people against them).
146
See M. Anne Britt et al., A Reasoned Approach to Dealing with Fake News, 6 POL’Y
INSIGHTS FROM THE BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 94–101 (2019), https://journals.sagepub.com/doi
/pdf/10.1177/2372732218814855 [https://perma.cc/8ZUF-25PY]; Dan. Sperber et al.,
Epistemic Vigilance, 25 MIND & LANGUAGE 359–393 (2010), https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468
-0017.2010.01394.x [https://perma.cc/KL8H-RN2J] (arguing that people operate with a suite
of epistemic vigilance tools targeted at the risk of being misinformed by others.) See also
boyd, supra note 35 (calling for “cognitive strengthening exercises[] to help students
recognize their own fault lines”).
147
See Britt et al., supra note 146, at 99 (recommending, inter alia, “public service
announcements on the potential dangers of having low epistemic vigilance . . . ”).
148
Cf. Dannagal G. Young, Let’s Disrupt the Logic That’s Driving Americans Apart,
NIEMANLAB,
https://www.niemanlab.org/2020/01/lets-disrupt-the-logic-thats-drivingamericans-apart/ [https://perma.cc/KPG5-DE3C] (last visited Mar. 2, 2020).
149
See, e.g., boyd, supra note 35.
150
See discussion supra note 72.
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want to relax and enjoy a less stressful, hedonic mindset. The easiest way to interpret
warnings about disinformation in such circumstances may be to adopt a general
attitude of cynicism and disbelief in all information, rather than choosing to develop
a more granular system for cherry-picking types of information requiring a more
critical outlook. This may be a rational response for people who feel inundated with
information and who will be exposed to competing, contending, and fatiguing
accounts of what is to be trusted online. Similarly, it is not unreasonable for people
focusing on the workings of what has been called “surveillance capitalism” to
become distrustful and resentful of their commodification in the online space.151 The
increasing public outcry against the power of Big Tech today may well be attributed
to users’ recognition of the specific—disempowered and manipulated—roles they
play in attention markets. Further, widespread information about the ways in which
online audiences are manipulated for political or economic purposes may lead to
feelings of lack of control, being overwhelmed, and a degree of generalized distrust
that could undermine possible benefits of transparency. People throwing up their
hands is precisely contrary to the goals of media literacy.
Another problem particularly with the suggestion of transparency as to the
evolving methods of disinformation and manipulation is that it would be undesirable
to provide a playbook for bad actors—teaching unsophisticated purveyors of
disinformation new and more effective methods, making sophisticated actors aware
of what is already known about their methods (triggering further innovation in
disinformation methodologies), and giving audiences the illusory sense that they are
prepared to combat manipulation as new forms are morphing in the shadow of their
false confidence.
These concerns should not be ignored. Indeed, they should be considered when
designing the optimal ways to operationalize the types of transparency suggested
here.152
151
I refer in text to the fact that users’ online activities are the commodity from which
the platforms profit. The tech platforms and social media profit significantly from extracting
and selling an extensive amount of information they collect about their users. See generally
FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT CONTROL
MONEY AND INFORMATION (2016) (explaining how tech platforms exploit and profit from
their users’ data); SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM (2019)
(coining the term “surveillance capitalism” to refer to commodification of personal
information).
152
While it is beyond the scope of this Essay to provide details, transparency initiatives
should be tested against the question of whether they minimize the two types of negative
effects identified above. For example, if the public were to trust source indicators and
attention prompts, as discussed above in text accompanying notes 68–74, they wouldn’t have
to feel the need to shift from System 1 to System 2 thinking overall when going online. They
could rely on outside triggers for their shift in modes of attention and application of critical
thinking. Similarly, perhaps dissemination of information about disinformation could be
designed to be effective without going into as great detail for the public at large as for
journalists themselves.
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B. Media Self-literacy
Much of the discussion above of media literacy (in both its narrow and broad
meanings) focuses on the information-consuming public—the audience. But
journalists as well must become the targets of literacy efforts. Recent research
suggests that although most Americans do not blame journalists for creating “madeup news,” the majority wants the media to be responsible for fixing the problem.153
But reporters cannot “fix” the problem without themselves honing tools beyond
traditional newspaper reporting.
If journalists can routinely become more self-conscious about and more deeply
understand their sources and the data they crunch, and more able to use technological
tools to communicate explanatory context for their work more effectively, then
information literacy might have a more systemically positive impact—beyond
making individual audience members more aware of specific pieces of informational
falsity.154
Journalists and news organizations should also engage in more searching selfconsciousness and adaptation. For example, close attention to the diffusion patterns
of disinformation online suggests that the mainstream institutional press has not
adequately addressed the degree to which its newsworthiness norms can manipulate
it into repeating and amplifying false narratives on important social and political
matters.155 Improvements on that front might be helpful in reducing distrust.
1. Including Journalists as Proper Targets of Literacy Initiatives
Journalists today are working with less time, fewer resources, less security,
more reliance on social media, more analytics-driven coverage decisions, and more
fear of violence. They are at risk of drowning in Twitter feeds and unable to spend
the time to nail down multiple sources for every story.They also operate with a much
thinner layer of editorial oversight in newsrooms that are increasingly less insulated
from the commercial operations of their news organizations.156 The gutting of many

153

See Mitchell et al., supra note 39.
See discussion infra Section III.B.1.
155
See e.g., BENKLER ET AL., supra note 132, at 34, 225–33 (discussing inter alia how
mainstream media practices centered on balance and scoops inadvertently spread political
disinformation circulated by ideological right-wing media); Phillips, supra note 8
(discussing media amplification of information pollution); see also JOAN DONOVAN & BRIAN
FRIEDBERG, DATA & SOC’Y, SOURCE HACKING: MEDIA MANIPULATION IN PRACTICE 6 (Sept.
4, 2019), https://datasociety.net/output/source-hacking-media-manipulation-in-practice/
(describing “source hacking” techniques strategically used to convince mainstream media to
further disseminate falsity).
156
See, e.g., Lili Levi, A “Faustian Pact”? Native Advertising and the Future of the
Press, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 647, 653–54 (2015).
154
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newspaper beats has meant that layers of expertise have disappeared.157 At the same
time, the simultaneous availability of large swaths of data and technologically
sophisticated analytical tools both create the possibility of new kinds of in-depth
news and analysis and substantive challenges for many journalists who are
inadequately trained in quantitative methods and data literacy. Furthermore, the
increasingly visual environment in which news consumption takes place has led to
the use of fact-heavy communicative modes, visual displays and graphics in
storytelling, and explanatory journalism.158 When journalists don’t fully understand
how to wield those tools (and when the public is not equipped to recognize
deceptiveness in visuals), their output can itself be misleading.159 Media literacy,
then, should be read expansively to call for training with respect both to
understanding and being able to explain data.
In addition, journalists today stand at risk of a variety of increasingly
sophisticated “source hacking” techniques designed to manipulate their coverage by
hiding the sources of questionable information in order to promote its diffusion in
mainstream media.160 Part of what media literacy means today should include
journalists themselves becoming more deeply aware of the complex new ways in
which journalistic processes can be manipulated.161
157

See generally PEN AMERICA, LOSING THE NEWS: THE DECIMATION OF LOCAL
JOURNALISM AND THE SEARCH FOR SOLUTIONS (2019), https://pen.org/wpcontent/uploads/2019/11/Losing-the-News-The-Decimation-of-Local-Journalism-and-theSearch-for-Solutions-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/82AG-PVEB] (reporting on the effects of
the “decimation of local news” at the community level); cf. Joshua Benton, Damaged
Newspapers, Damaged Civic Life: How the Gutting of Local Newsrooms Has Led to a LessInformed Public, NEIMANLAB (Nov. 22, 2019, 12:47 PM), https://www.niemanlab.org/2019
/11/damaged-newspapers-damaged-civic-life-how-the-gutting-of-local-newsrooms-has-ledto-a-less-informed-public/ [https://perma.cc/J6S8-YRY3] (describing the negative impact of
the decline of local newsroom staff on local politics).
158
See, e.g., John McDermott, Explaining What’s Behind the Sudden Allure of
Explanatory Journalisme, DIGIDAY (Mar. 17, 2014), https://digiday.com/media/explainerrise-explanatory-journalism/ [https://perma.cc/4GNA-29TT] (defining explanatory
journalism and exploring its development); Chip Scanlan, How the New York Times Tracked
Public Data to Produce “Killing Khashoggi,” NIEMANSTORYBOARD (May 9, 2019),
https://niemanstoryboard.org/stories/how-the-new-york-times-tracked-public-data-to-prod
uce-killing-khashoggi/ [https://perma.cc/T7J6-R5TK] (discussing the emergence of visual
journalism to report on “the tragedies of our time”).
159
See generally ALBERTO CAIRO, HOW CHARTS LIE: GETTING SMARTER ABOUT
VISUAL INFORMATION (2019) (cataloguing, inter alia, common mistakes made by journalists
about data and its visual representation).
160
See DONOVAN & FRIEDBERG, supra note 155, at 5 (describing such “source hacking”
techniques used to manipulate media, including viral sloganeering, leak forgery, evidence
collages, and keyword squatting).
161
For such a recommendation by a journalist, see Laurie Putnam, There’s a Growing
Body of Research on Mis/Disinformation. Let’s Put It to Work., MEDIUM (Jan. 30, 2020),
https://medium.com/@laurieputnam/theres-a-growing-body-of-research-on-mis-disinform

980

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 4

2. Focusing Attention on Digital Newsworthiness Standards and Robust
Truth-checking
It must be noted that news organizations themselves have played a role in the
propagation and amplification of mis/disinformation online. Examples abound of
maliciously planted “fake news” originating in a limited-audience chat room being
viralized via dissemination by various levels of more established, mainstream news
outlets.162 Journalistic self-awareness—media self-literacy—should be an important
component of an invigorated media literacy designed to reduce manipulation of the
media.
Traditional ideas of newsworthiness sometimes lead to the coverage of
mis/disinformation. When newsworthiness is interpreted as stories that will pique
the audience’s interest, these will sometimes be the most sensational stories—and
those that are more likely to be subjects of mis/disinformation. So, a view of
newsworthiness that promotes sensational material while reducing the ability of the
news organization to engage in the appropriate level of confirmatory processes will
often lead to an increase in unwitting dissemination of false information by reputable
press organizations. In addition, although newsworthiness decisions have typically
been made in mainstream news organizations via an editorial process, coverage
decisions are increasingly subjected, inter alia, to algorithmic influences and
analytics.163 To the extent that newsworthiness decisions are made on the basis of
analytics that focus on trending stories online, then sophisticated techniques of
manipulation and “source hacking” can skew the newsworthiness decision to
greenlight disinformation that has been positioned to trend well.164 At a minimum,
this kind of metric-influenced newsworthiness decision-making might skew toward
undue tolerance for the possibility of disseminating false information.165
ation-let-s-put-it-to-work-b697f4ec368f [https://perma.cc/W6D5-44XY] (calling for
newsrooms and reporters to put to work existing research on mis/disinformation and how to
curb it).
162
See, e.g., id.; Whitney Phillips, The Oxygen of Amplification, DATA & SOC’Y (May
22, 2018), https://datasociety.net/output/oxygen-of-amplification/ [https://perma.cc/4U6U64AR] (considering the effects of reporting on certain topics and suggesting better practices
for journalists); Ravi Somaiya, The Junk Cycle, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. (2019),
https://www.cjr.org/special_report/facebook-video-pelosi-media.php [https://perma.cc/2S
L6-636N] (discussing a doctored video of Nancy Pelosi that was shared on Facebook and by
several reputable sources); see also Whitney Phillips, The Internet Is a Toxic Hellscape—
But We Can Fix It, WIRED (Feb. 3, 2020), https://www.wired.com/story/the-internet-is-atoxic-hellscape-but-we-can-fix-it/ [https://perma.cc/E7LG-2LN2] (reporting on the
“amplification feedback loops that exist between media manipulators and mainstream
journalists . . .”).
163
See, e.g., Carroll, supra note 142.
164
See DONOVAN & FRIEDBERG, supra notes 155, 162.
165
Traditional news organizations’ approaches to newsworthiness might sometimes
even lead to the dissemination of disinformation when the news organization knows that the
information it is publishing is false. This is likely to happen when the press thinks that the
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Customary presumptions underlying news organizations’ approaches to
newsworthiness determinations may lead to press self-sabotage.166 To the extent that
the spreading of disinformation has been part of a domestic political tactic (domestic
governmental positioning), the press is often left flat-footed. For example,
newsworthiness decisions about political and governmental matters have often been
driven by structural imperatives and press norms. Traditional news norms presume
that presidential statements are presumptively newsworthy and proper subjects of
reporting. When such presidential statements are grounded on false facts or
misleading characterizations167 and constitute parts of a strategy to delegitimize
other institutions (such as the press itself),168 though, reporting on them pits
traditional press norms against the imperative not to spread falsity. When a high
public official’s tweets are based on or refer to disinformation, they should simply
not be covered.169 Content rather than status should be the key in newsworthiness
decisions. In addition, mindful of critiques of simple-minded “bothsideism,”170 news
information should be further disseminated in an attempt to debunk it or because the media
expect that audiences might find the fact of such falsehoods significant (for example, if it
were disseminated by a public figure).
166
Some argue that journalists and news organizations should subject themselves to
quantitative analysis. See, e.g., Sarah Schmalbach, Journalist, Quantify Thyself,
NIEMANLAB, https://www.niemanlab.org/2019/12/journalist-quantify-thyself/ [https://perm
a.cc/J9AE-YJYM] (last visited Feb. 21, 2020) (suggesting that journalists and news outlets
become more self-reflective on what, and for whom, they are reporting).
News organizations should consider reducing the extent of opinion and commentary
and clearly label their coverage. See Joseph E. Uscinski, Conspiracy Theories for
Journalists, in CONSPIRACY THEORIES AND THE PEOPLE WHO BELIEVE THEM 443, 448
(2019).
167
For an example of fact-checks describing President Trump’s false or misleading
statements, see Donald Trump, POLITIFACT, https://www.politifact.com/personalities/donald
-trump/ [https://perma.cc/C4E5-WYK6] (last visited Feb. 21, 2020) (providing President
Trump’s falsity scorecard); Glenn Kessler et al., President Trump Has Made 15,413 False
or Misleading Claims over 1,055 Days, WASH. POST (Dec. 16. 2019, 4:52 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/12/16/president-trump-has-made-false-ormisleading-claims-over-days/ [https://perma.cc/5LHW-7U3V].
168
See, e.g., David Smith, ‘Enemy of the People’: Trump’s War on the Media Is a Page
from Nixon’s Playbook, GUARDIAN (Sept. 7, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2019/sep/07/donald-trump-war-on-the-media-oppo-research [https://perma.cc/85TXN4NB].
169
If the whole point is to show that the President is relying for his information on false
channels, that in itself should be sufficient to report, without further disseminating the
underlying disinformation itself.
Media theorists, such as Prof. Jay Rosen, have called for the American press to take
back the news agenda from the Trump administration. See, e.g., Jay Rosen (@jayrosen_nyu),
TWITTER (July 21, 2019, 3:44 PM), https://twitter.com/jayrosen_nyu/status/115305826197
4888448?lang=en [https://perma.cc/7QW5-U5XK].
170
See, e.g., Jon Allsop, Both Sides, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. (Dec. 16, 2019),
https://www.cjr.org/the_media_today/both-sides-impeachment-trump.php [https://perma.cc

982

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 4

organizations should interrogate their coverage practices and shy away from
amplifying propaganda.171 An increase in the diversity and inclusion of
newsrooms—with respect, inter alia, to race, gender, class, approach to journalism,
and ideology—may increase press self-examination and self-awareness in beneficial
ways in these connections. The press should not allow itself to be treated like a pawn
in a political exercise of public relations. Nor should it position itself as an enemy
combatant whose every action is in reaction to an oppositional frame selected by the
executive. The press should resist government appropriation of agenda-setting for
public discourse and should reclaim its place as a monitor of power.
Journalistic practices are not exempt from blame. Reporters have been
insufficiently self-conscious about the ways in which the ecosystem of news can be
strategically manipulated to viralize the spread of disinformation.172 They need to
study the ways in which their own practices invite gaming by motivated actors. It is
imperative for journalists (and audiences) to develop a sophisticated understanding
of evolving techniques of disinformation and press manipulation.173 In addition,
easier and more complete access by researchers (if not journalists) to social media
analytics and algorithmic developments could help.
Reporters’ own process short-cuts also doubtless sow distrust. Sometimes, as
noted above, the news organizations do not have the leisure—either economically
or temporally—to vet the deluge of information reporters receive. Reporters cut
corners and rely on proxies for believability and reliability—such as repeating
stories previously reported by other relatively reputable organizations or relying on
apparently trustworthy sources and stories on Twitter.174 The newsworthiness
/HU8K-7S5Z].
171
See, e.g., Jay Rosen, The Christmas Eve Confessions of Chuck Todd, PRESSTHINK
BLOG (Dec. 26, 2019, 1:40 AM), http://pressthink.org/2019/12/the-christmas-eveconfessions-of-chuck-todd/ [https://perma.cc/XW8N-LRBA] (criticizing the press for
“strategic blindness” in failing to recognize the intentional deployment of disinformation by
the Trump administration and its political supporters).
172
See discussion supra Section III.B.1.
173
Donovan and Friedberg explain the need for journalists to increase awareness of the
degree to which professional trolls understand the levers to pull to get press attention and the
roles reporters play in an amplification network. See DONOVAN & FRIEDBERG, supra note
155, at 17; Mathew Ingram, Source Hacking: How Trolls Manipulate the Media, COLUM.
JOURNALISM REV. (Sept. 12, 2019), https://www.cjr.org/the_media_today/trolls-manipulatemedia.php [https://perma.cc/H3TV-4J3D].
174
See, e.g., DONOVAN & FRIEDBERG, supra note 155, at 31; Mathew Ingram, Do
Journalists Pay Too Much Attention to Twitter?, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. (Oct. 10, 2018),
https://www.cjr.org/the_media_today/journalists-on-twitter-study.php [https://perma.cc/4U
G5-SKY3]; Rob Tornoe, Digital Publishing: To Stop Misinformation from Spreading,
Journalists Shouldn’t Fall Down the Social Media Rabbit Hole, EDITOR & PUBLISHER (June
19,
2019),
https://www.editorandpublisher.com/columns/digital-publishing-to-stopmisinformation-from-spreading-journalists-shouldnt-fall-down-the-social-media-rabbithole/ [https://perma.cc/GW3H-8NDN]; see also Logan Molyneux & Shannon McGregor,
Think Twice Before Turning to Twitter, NIEMANLAB, https://www.niemanlab.org/2019/12/
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decisions are thus deeply enmeshed with the rest of the news organizations’ news
generation and checking practices. If the fact-checking and corroboration practices
are less robust as a result of economic pressures, then there will be little to serve as
a counterweight to the appearance of newsworthiness and credibility. So, one aspect
of an expanded approach to media or information literacy, particularly as directed to
journalists themselves, would be to focus attention on the robustness of reputable
news organizations’ corroborative and investigative processes. It would be
particularly important for journalists, as well as editors, to engage in better vetting
of Twitter sources; to find corroboration prior to reporting on social media
campaigns; to interrogate the algorithmically-derived results of inquiries into online
information trends; to increase their fact-checking expertise (including through
increased facility with information access tools such as state sunshine laws and the
federal Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), and through effective crowdsourcing).
Moreover—because errors are inevitable—sophisticated attention, informed by
social science data, should be given to after-the-fact error correction by news
organizations when they realize that they have disseminated false or misleading
information. That sort of correction should not be left up to the obscure factchecking processes of Big Tech platforms. (And speaking of the social media
platforms, the nature of the relationship between news publishers and tech platforms
is such that self-awareness on the part of legacy organizations is not sufficient.
Sustained attention must be paid to the relationship between news media and social
media platforms.175)
CONCLUSION
The turn to media literacy as a weapon against mis/disinformation has much to
recommend it—especially if it is implemented with a view to effectiveness through
the responsive use of insights from social science research. But—even if media
literacy techniques improve enough to allow effective debunking of individual false
claims—such a narrow focus is insufficiently responsive to the critical problems of
today. What is needed now is to fight not only individual bits of disinformation but
the much broader delegitimizing enterprise of casting the mainstream news media
as “fake news.” A good start for that is to provide transparent information about the
processes of journalistic activity itself, the structure of the rapidly changing media
ecosystem, the cognitive biases that affect human decisionmaking, and the ways in
which information online can be strategically manipulated.
It is neither naïve nor unwarranted to call for greater transparency and public
access to information about press processes and to search for ways to reverse public
distrust of the press. Surely media literacy can be an effective part of that project,

think-twice-before-turning-to-twitter/ [https://perma.cc/3XVP-SDRD] (last visited Mar. 2,
2020) (describing the unhealthy feedback loop between journalists and Twitter).
175
Such an analysis is beyond the scope of this Essay.
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although not its only tool.176 While much press criticism is right on point, the
question is always “compared to what?” The American press has, by-and-large, been
a commercial industry since before the Founding.177 That alone cannot be enough to
justify deeming it, as such, unworthy of trust. American newspapers have been
increasingly professionalized. The history of the American press in the twentieth
century reveals the growing adoption of professional ethical standards, at least
among legacy press organizations178 (even if those standards are typically honored
in the breach by at least some segments of the media). Today, with widespread
informational access and public discussion, the press is subject to extensive study
and critique. Media entities are busily attempting to define their brands.179 Even
though many people get their news via social media, it is important to distinguish
between social media and the press—and not to attribute to the press/news
organizations either the incentives or the practices of information
distributors/intermediaries. To the extent that the public distrusts news on social
media and calls for information from reputable sources, news organizations have
economic incentives to invest in reputations for credibility.
It is not enough simply to place the burden of addressing information
pathologies on the audience. Such an individualized, user-focused approach should
176

Because the focus for media literacy should not be limited to inoculation against
individual pieces of false information, critiques of media literacy claiming that people share
fake news for reasons beyond ignorance of falsity (see, e.g., Marwick, supra note 61) are
less damning.
177
See, e.g., Martha Minow, The Changing Ecosystem of News and Challenges for
Freedom of the Press, 64 LOY. L. REV. 499, 518–19 (2018).
178
For important histories of the American press, see generally, for example, MICHAEL
SCHUDSON, DISCOVERING THE NEWS: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF AMERICAN NEWSPAPERS
(1978); PAUL STARR, THE CREATION OF THE MEDIA: POLITICAL ORIGINS OF MODERN
COMMUNICATIONS (2004). Although journalism ethics in Europe can be traced back to the
Seventeenth Century, professional codes of ethics of objective journalism developed in the
U.S. in the early Twentieth Century, with the American Society of Newspaper Editors
publishing its ethical principles in 1923. See Harvey Saalberg, The Canons of Journalism: A
50-Year Perspective, 50 JOURNALISM QUARTERLY 731, 731 (1973); see also SPJ CODE OF
ETHICS, SOCIETY OF PROFESSIONAL JOURNALISTS, https://www.spj.org/ethicscode.asp
[https://perma.cc/RUQ2-WMPK] (last updated Sept. 6, 2014) (detailing contemporary
journalism ethics guidelines). In addition to such codes, many mainstream news
organizations’ ethics codes can be found at Codes of Ethics: North America, ACCOUNTABLE
JOURNALISM https://accountablejournalism.org/ethics-codes/north_america [https://perma.
cc/L7YS-BT6Q] (last visited Mar. 15, 2020). See generally JOURNALISM’S ETHICAL
PROGRESSION: A TWENTIETH CENTURY STORY (Gwyneth Mellinger & John P. Ferré eds.,
2020) (collectings essays).
179
A recent study suggests that how audiences perceive the reporting of news
organizations on social media may not have much to do with their brand. See Sterrett et al.,
supra note 63, at 794–97. Although this study refers to the existing landscape rather than
future efforts, its results should still be taken into account as news organizations negotiate
for carriage with the social media platforms.
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not distract from the thornier structural issues implicated in information policy. The
field of antitrust has revived and is even being rethought in ways that can be helpful
in structural media critique.180 But, at the same time, structural solutions do not
necessarily solve for the ways in which people process information and engage both
with news and democratic institutions. An expanded view of media literacy can
fruitfully be seen as one part of a mosaic of responses to the pathologies in today’s
information landscape.
However we get there, framing the issue in this way makes it clear that the
choice is not between the perfect and the good enough, but between degrees and
types of imperfection. Imperfect as it is, a free and robust press makes signal
contributions to democracy. Indeed, the possibility of renewed public support for
core press activity may itself be a first step toward building a virtuous cycle in which
at least some press sectors more intentionally seek to meet their public interest
obligations. We risk too much if we do not commit to a sustained, rigorously
evidence-based, multi-pronged attempt to rehabilitate the democratic role of the
press. Well-thought-out initiatives for media literacy could productively be part of
that strategy.

180

Beyond the scope of this Essay but certainly relevant to the project of promoting
better journalism, for example, would be attention to the negative consequences of
financially-justified coverage decisions of increasingly consolidated legacy newspaper
organizations. See, e.g., Penelope Muse Abernathy, The Expanding News Desert, HUSSMAN
SCH. OF JOURNALISM AND MEDIA, https://www.usnewsdeserts.com/reports/expandingnews-desert/ [https://perma.cc/G7BF-3DUY] (last visited Feb. 21, 2020). The problematic
impact of media concentration is obviously one of the structural issues that must be addressed
in addition to the audience-focused frame of traditional media literacy efforts.

